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Synopsis 
 
Nanotechnology talk is moving out of its comfort zone of scientific discourse. As new 
products go to market and national and international organizations roll out public 
engagement programs on nanotechnology to discuss environmental and health issues, 
various sectors of the public are beginning to discuss what all the fuss is about. Non-
Governmental Organizations have long since reacted; however, now the social sciences 
have begun to study the cultural phenomenon of nanotechnology, thus extending 
discourses and opening out nanotechnology to whole new social dimensions. We report 
here on these social dimensions and their new constructed imaginings, each of which is 
evident in the ways in which discourses around nanotechnology intersects with the 
economy, ecology, health, governance, and imagined futures. We conclude that there 
needs to be more than just an ‘environmental, legal and social implications’, or ‘ELSI’, 
sideshow within nanotechnology. The collective public imaginings of nanotechnology 
include tangles of science and science fiction, local enterprise and global transformation, 
all looking forward towards a sustainable future, while looking back on past debates 
about science and nature. Nanotechnology is already very much embedded in the social 
fabric of our life and times. 
 
 
6.145.1 Introduction 
 
 
The six volumes in this series have described powerful opportunities that nanotechnology 
presents for society, as represented by those of us who work within and around the 
physical sciences. But how is nanotechnology represented to and understood by the rest 
of society? What are the risks, benefits and other perspectives of nanotechnology that can 
be said to be shared knowledge among and between nano-specialists and non-specialists?   
 
Much of the discussion on nanotechnology covered in this chapter is often placed under 
the banner of environmental health and safety (EHS) issues or environmental, legal and 
social implications (ELSI), separating them from the science of nanomaterials. We prefer, 
however, to fix our gaze on the shared visions of technological specialists and non-
specialists alike when imagining a world with nanotechnology. As nanotechnology is 
seen as an important future development, scientific, technological, health and 
environmental issues associated with its application are expected to be closely linked to 
wider social, ethical and cultural concerns.  
 
This chapter focuses then on what can broadly be called the ‘public imaginary’ of 
nanotechnology.  In this context, the term ‘public’ needs to be defined better. We refer 
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here to ‘publics’ rather than a singular public, reflecting the contemporary sociological 
view that science and technology is understood and used by various different public 
contexts, and that scientists of different hues are also part of these publics.  We do not 
have the space here to present a detailed case about why understanding public 
perspectives on science is important. But the various perspectives of nanotechnology here 
will present enough evidence about the complexities of nanotechnology in nature and 
society.  The concept of the ‘imaginary’ should not imply that acts of imagination are 
used to perceive nanotechnology not founded on reality. In sketching out imaginaries, we 
find the extremes from a utopian technoscientific nano-future to the nightmare ‘grey goo’ 
scenario and much in between. Imaginaries are therefore imaginings of nanotechnology, 
and within these imaginaries scientific and non-scientific descriptions are interwoven. Far 
from a perceived scientific reality, however, the ethical and philosophical import of a 
suite of technologies that draw on narratives of ultra-durability, unlimited information 
storage, or nanoscale technologies that can rearrange matter, develop devices that can 
enter the body, and self-replicate, is powerful. Proponents of nanotechnology see the 
future as  
a ‘new industrial revolution’ that will include 
breakthroughs in computer efficiency, pharmaceuticals, 
nerve and tissue repair, surface coatings, catalysts, 
sensors, materials, telecommunications, and pollution 
control (Machnaghten  et al, 2005a, p272, citing 
European Commission, 2004; House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee, 2004; Roco and 
Bainbridge, 2001) 
Whether this happens or not, more skeptical social science commentators would at least 
say that nanotechnology represents a whole new way of looking at new technologies 
(Machnaghten  et al, 2005a, 2005b), going beyond the concern merely for public 
acceptance of new technological development, and seeing it instead as a testing ground 
for combined knowledge-making by scientists of many disciplines as well as policy-
makers and what used to be referred to as the ‘lay public’. Where once a new technology 
was seen as being exclusively developed, and thus mostly understood, by experts, and 
this knowledge then imparted to a non-knowledgeable ‘public’, now cultural reference 
points and public representations of nanotechnology are seen within the social sciences as 
vital to the totality of understanding. The way nanotechnology is talked about in new 
contexts creates new meanings for the word. 
 
These ways of looking at nanotechnology then are necessarily cultural, and they are the 
foundation for how we have approached this chapter. But on top of this foundation, of 
course, are the very real benefits or threats that those who are currently researching, or 
are concerned about, the technologies refer to. The perceived potential impacts on society 
range from the management of nanoparticles in the environment to the philosophical and 
governance issues associated with the molecular manufacturing of nature.  
 
Sandler (2009) has suggested that those of us who are looking at the sociology and public 
response of nanotechnology innovation might be better served to agree on the term 
‘issues’ rather than ‘implications’, which are, he states, neither determined nor 
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determinable at this present time.  Part of our argument here is that issues themselves are 
not yet determined either until there is more public awareness and public engagement. 
 
The experiences of the current authors are brought to bear on what nanotechnology 
means in difference contexts. This is an interdisciplinary chapter, written by experts in 
specific fields of nanosciences, political sciences, and communications. The chapter maps 
the state of knowledge in the many related and unrelated fields of research.  In the fields 
of nanoscale research, these areas of research  connect back to seminal citations in the 
scientific literature that include, but are not limited to, surfaces, thin films and 
multilayers, materials, nanowires and catalysts, quantum dots (QDs), carbon nanotubes 
(CNTs), titanium dioxide, optics and photonics, and electron and atomic force 
microscopes. Today we also have scientific literature that cover fullerenes, 
nanotoxicology, nanosensors, molecular genetics, self –assembled mono-layers, 
nanophotonics, and nanoelectronics, among other fields (Kostoff  et al, 2006). 
Because of nanotechnology’s interdisciplinary nature, terms are often contested; the 
rationale for using ‘nanotechnology’ as a catch-all frame of reference here is because the 
term has condensed in the public imagination, at least for those who have heard of, or 
have an understanding of, the term. Outside of specialist fields, however, the term is 
largely still unknown, as the public awareness research we present here shows. There 
have been many problems in the consistency of definitions. Can there be a standard 
definition of nanoscience, nanoscale or nanotechnology across disciplines? There are 
variances based on technology or discipline. ‘Bottom up’ is a concept wherein molecular 
tools are assembled from molecular processes, for example ‘growing’ nanoparticles 
through atomic and molecular crystals, whereas ‘top-down’ is a materials science 
perspective wherein smaller and smaller scales are created from larger-scale tools such as 
milling or etching. There can also be regional variances. Munshi  et al (2007) refer to the 
distinctions between US and UK definitions (1 and 100 nanometres (nm) for the former, 
between 0.2 and 100 nm for the latter). The ‘A to Z’ of nanotechnology (2009) from 
Australia, sourced from the National Nanotechnology Institute, claims US and UK 
definitions to be analogous, with the Japanese at variance with the 50 to 100nm range 
classified as ‘ultrafines’. There is tension among some nanotechnologists in various 
industries over terms which denote nanoscience rather than nanotechnology, and vice 
versa (The European Parliament has settled for ‘nanomaterials’ (European Parliament 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, 2009). Although many 
scientists wish to differentiate between terms, a recent OECD statement to public 
engagement specialists and outreach managers states that  ‘‘nanotechnology’ has to be 
understood as covering both nanosciences and nanotechnologies’. From the outset then 
we use the term ‘nanotechnology’ to mean the plural ‘nanotechnologies’ and also 
‘nanosciences’, ‘nanomaterials’ and ‘nanoscale research’. 
Sociological and science communication research focuses heavily on how various people 
from a multitude of backgrounds can approach unknown spaces like this hi-tech arena 
and construct meaning. Anyone working on any field of nanotechnology must 
acknowledge the unknown quality about it, the mystique. It may not even matter, of 
course, that there is a lack of ‘nano’ awareness, at least not in the diffuse and amorphous 
terms in which we define it here.  At the rate of current development in the scientific 
literature, the prefix ‘nano’ may be obsolete within a generation anyway, such is the 
widespread use of the various strands of technologies across the disciplines. 
Nanotechnology becomes a ‘thing’, whether a thing constructed by specialists or by non-
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specialists, a thing that may be hard to define precisely, but nonetheless which has 
enough currency at the moment for everyone to, at the moment, talk about.  
We also report here on some scientific agreement on the hazards and risks of 
nanoparticles, although here there is still widespread disagreement.  Since 2000, the 
National Science Foundation has identified social and environmental implications of 
manufactured nanoparticles such as quantum dots (QDs), carbon nanotubules (CNTs) and 
titanium dioxide particles (Albrecht  et al, 2006). 
Outside of scientific disciplines, nanotechnology has become an exciting area of 
discussion in the social sciences within the last five years, particularly in science and 
technology studies (STS) and the sub-discipline of science communication. 
Nanotechnology is considered a new terrain in some respects—being such a newly 
emerging technology affords it the opportunity to be a ‘blank canvas’ for public 
communication, thereby avoiding some of the pitfalls, it is hoped by many, that 
characterized other types of new technologies regarding public acceptance and media 
controversy such as stem cell research and genetically modified organisms (GMOs).  
There has been a turn in risk literature to more qualitative methods of defining risk 
constructions (Wynne, 1992; Smith  et al, 2006) and nanotechnology may be seen as an 
excellent test case for this development (Macnaghten  et al 2005a). 
While much has been written in both risk assessment and risk communication literature, 
there has also been increasing interest in nanotechnology as a social and cultural 
phenomenon from mass media analysts and writers of sociology and social theory. 
Interests here include: how nanotechnology is understood, visualized and talked about 
across networks that include mediated communication between scientists, scientific 
instruments and imagery; fictional dystopian/utopian scenarios; how science and 
technology is represented by social movements; technology and critical theory and 
poststructural analysis of texts.  
There is a new understanding in this era often defined as ‘late modernity’ where the 
relationships and boundaries between humanity, technology and nature have been called 
into question, on a scale as never before in history. The multidisciplinary nature of 
nanotechnology, and the implications of this much-talked-about technology for the 
materials and environmental sciences as well as the IT and health sectors is now rapidly 
unfolding.  
 
We begin this chapter by outlining our common theoretical context for how a 
transformative technology like nanotechnology might, to paraphrase Bruno Latour 
(1987), move into society.  While we concentrate here on those texts that either describe 
or comment on nanotechnology, we place them in a wider context using concepts from 
social theory in late modernity and the ‘risk society’ of sociologists Ulrich Beck and 
Anthony Giddens. In this risk society that has emerged in the 20th century, risk and its 
management play a key role in social and political affairs, as well as the negotiation of 
issues regarding personal and ecological safety, lifestyle and decision-making.   
 
Then, in turn, we look at various areas where nanotechnology is perceived to have an 
impact on society in terms of sustainability and visions of progress. We specifically focus 
on: 
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• how the various fields are described in terms of their economic potential; how 
innovation and new products on the market may (or may not) transform society 
and how military and business interests have nanotechnology high on the agenda;   
• the dichotomized narratives of  nanotechnology’s role in relation to 
ecology, perceived within many technoscientific systems, on the one hand, 
as a key to green energy – and even a tool employed for the cooling down 
of global warming – and on the other hand as an environmental threat 
particularly by nanoparticle exposure; 
• the similar promise/threat dichotomy often presented for nanotechnology 
for healthcare, through future-oriented narratives of nanobots and 
nanoparticle delivery through the body, seen as either (or both) a form of 
human  enhancement or as toxic;   
• the implications for global equity, in terms of rights and equality for 
persons, systems and developing countries; where a predicted cheap 
technology first becomes excessively expensive, then (again potentially) 
becomes omnipresent and invades private spaces and the realm of 
‘identities’; 
• the implications for the governance of nanotechnology, how society itself 
deals with it, as it currently appears to have an elitist business-academic 
ownership, and how can it (or should it) truly be transformative if there is 
limited public engagement; and 
• how all of the foregoing are being imagined as a myriad of futures through 
science fiction scenario-building, that although rejected by those scientists 
within their intrinsic works, cannot escape the sci-fi legacies of Drexler 
and Joy in creating  nano-nightmares and nano-dreams by inventing, 
through fictional tropes, everything from nano-assemblers to elevators to 
space (Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, 2009).  
 
 
New collaborative efforts have emerged to steer the course of nanotechnology 
with combined society, ethics, understandings of nature, and sustainability 
dimensions. Approaches have been used with terms such as ‘upstream public 
engagement’ ‘midstream modulation’ (Fisher  et al, 2006), ‘accountable’ nano 
labs (Doubleday, 2007), see-through science (Wilsdon and Willis, 2005) or 
constructive or real-time technology assessments (Schot and Rip, 1997 and 
Gaston and Sarewitz, 2002, respectively). These terms all describe different social 
worlds, from lab to media, where distinct knowledge and power practices around 
what nanotechnology might mean come into play. We look at these terms later in 
the chapter, and indeed critique whether or not the development of disparate 
technologies can be seen as a linear ‘stream’ in any real sense. But first let us 
examine our social-theoretical context for nanotechnology, environment and 
society. 
 
 
6.145.2 21st Century Relationships between Science, Technology, Society 
and the Environment 
 
 
Although often ridiculed in other contexts, Donald Rumsfeld’s famous quote 
about there being ‘known unknowns and unknown unknowns’ is used to describe 
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how we might currently think about the risks associated with nanotechnology. 
The category to which unknowns attributable to nanotechnology exist perhaps, is 
that of the unknown unknowns, those which are unpredictable and which cannot 
be accounted for using current scientific models and risk assessment (Wilsdon 
and Willis, 2005; Farber  et al. 2008). 
 
Recent studies on awareness of, and attitudes to, nanotechnology in various 
locales across the world suggests that little is known among publics about 
nanotechnology, as discussed further in Section 6.145.7.3  (Bainbridge, 2002; 
Cobb and Macoubrie, 2004; Hornig Priest, 2005; Lewenstein, 2005; Macoubrie , 
2005; Scheufele  and Lewenstein, 2005). The more answers nanotechnology 
appears to provide, the more questions are generated. There are many 
uncertainties.    
 
Uncertainty has an increasingly prominent role on the social and the personal 
spheres within society. Ulrich Beck describes how Western society deals with 
new and emerging technologies in this period of late modernity as the ‘risk 
society’. In this society, the old institutions and rules of early modernity, such as 
those belonging to religion, party politics, economics and science, are being 
challenged, in seeming paradox with increased technological advance and 
education across the Western world. There is greater individualism in social 
affairs, but also paradoxically, global networks are increasing by information and 
communications systems are improving through nanotechnological innovation. 
World events and ideas form a greater part of individual decision-making. Beck 
has referred to the phenomenon of reflexive modernization, a confrontation of 
society with itself. The notion of self, as Giddens (1991) has also noted, has 
created a reflexivity among both individuals and social structures. People and 
institutions are more self-aware. We might also tie these concepts to the notions 
of the ‘knowledge society’.  
 
Not without controversy, risk has been termed a construction, or a set of 
constructions, that are contested in ‘relations of risk-definition’ (Adam and van 
Loon, 2000, p2). Klaus Eder’s (1996b) important book on the framing of ecology 
and environmentalism also describes concepts of nature as a construction. What 
he means is that there is a binary notion society has of itself as separate from the 
world of scientific knowledge and the ‘wilderness’, culture versus nature. 
According to Eder, both are inseparably linked. Societies in modernity have 
differentiated the way we look at nature into three spheres - the social, the factual 
and the subjective. Many social science studies of late modernity have shown, 
however, that the boundaries between these spheres have become more blurred. A 
construction does not mean that there is an epistemological constraint of 
‘fabricated risk’ being ‘imagined.’ Risks are manufactured but are ultimately real. 
However, risks are constructed in that they are defined by various interest groups 
and stakeholders in a spaghetti junction of discourses.  
 
We have defined here a view of the concept of discourse.  Following Foucault, we 
look at discourse as a set of rules that govern bodies of text and utterances or as in 
the Hajer definition used by Munshi  et al, discourse may also be considered    
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a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and 
transformed in a particular set of practices and through 
which meaning is given to physical and social realities 
(Munshi  et al, 2007, citing Hajer, 1995b, p146). 
 
Fischer has also stated that  
 
[d]iscourses reflect the links between a particular ideology, 
how it is constructed, and how it can function to establish a 
group’s political power (Munshi  et al, 2007 citing Fischer 
1995).   
 
As scholars in the communication of risk, it is important that we look closely then 
at the phenomenon of uncertainty and how it can be engaged with and 
communicated between science and other communities, and between various 
publics, and its dimensions of power. For Beck and Giddens, institutions of 
modernity, such as strategic technoscientific facilities of nanotechnology actively 
create, engage with and manage concepts of risk. 
 
To address this risk society, we must acknowledge the triangular relationship 
between risks, technologies and futures (Adam and Van Loon, 2000). For Beck 
(1992), those in a position to legitimate risk—the mass media, scientists, 
politicians, the legal system—have key social positions. Much has been written 
about the politicizing of the narrative of risk and nature through green social 
movements. In the reflexive modernization sociology of Beck, Giddens and 
others, technology, politics and the environment will become, or are becoming, 
part of a new politics. Running alongside these green initiatives are the narratives 
of technological progress, full of promise and technology utopias. Beck speaks of 
a sub-politicization, a politics ‘no longer [about the] interests that dominate the 
political horizon but [about] claims about the legitimacy of particular forms of 
knowledge’ (ibid., p4) As a new industrial revolution is now predicted, we must 
then consider what consequences this might have for human and environmental 
safety in new ways. 
 
 
There is an emerging technological landscape, however, where there is increased 
economic and political competitiveness. There is a global battleground in future 
markets where the EU competes with the US and the rest of the world completes 
with Asia.  We must then ask: where does the consumer fit into this theoretical 
frame? Consumers (current or future) are the publics; they are ‘stakeholders’, 
whether specialists or not. It is against this theoretical background that this 
discussion on nanotechnology, environment and society is further shaped, 
reflecting on the many discussions about impacts and implications.  The 
complexity is increased by the variety of disciplines working within 
nanotechnology, and to a certain extent, commenting on the practices and 
processes that are often labeled in the nanotechnology domain. Munshi  et al 
(2007) draw attention to the inconsistent definitions and scales not only between 
those based in the US and the UK but also between different groups of 
professionals such as technoscientists and chemists. Oberdorster  et al (2007) and 
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Roco (2003) also refer to the fact that particles less than 100nm in linear size are 
considered nanoparticles by material scientists and toxicologists, while 
atmospheric scientists look for the nucleation mode of the atmospheric 
multimodal size distribution which less than 10nm. We cannot look for strict 
definitional agreement across the disciplines of nanotechnology but we can 
identify certain boundaries within which the catch-all term is applied. 
 
There is a multitude of ways of describing and engaging with nanotechnology that 
extend beyond the physical, chemical and biological sciences. These discourses of 
nanotechnology are studied by a range of multidisciplinary methods of social 
science analysis. In previous work, the present authors have mapped out the 
intersections of these discourses between scientific, sociological, cultural and 
policy worlds. We believe that the entire bounded area of nanotechnology can 
now be divided into distinct areas of discourse. For Munshi  et al (2007), there are 
nodes of discourse, where particular groups of people are central to demarcating 
boundaries of power associated with nanotechnology. These nodes are: (1) 
technoscientists, (2) business and industry leaders, (3) quasi-official bodies, (4) 
social science and humanities researchers, (5) fiction writers, (6) political 
activists, (7) journalists and popular science writers, and (8) publics excluded 
from all of the above. These distinctions are an important way for social science 
researchers in particular, but perhaps for all within these nodes, to look at the 
separation of powers within, and interactions between, these multiple enterprises, 
rather than expecting the existence of one type of discourse.  
 
Murphy (2009) uses a ‘theory of practice’ approach that also demarcates 
discourse on nanotechnology, but focuses on practices, cultural habits and ways 
of doing things, that incorporate methods and materials as well as people. These 
are sites of discourse, a grounding of these discourses at particular points that can 
only be analyzed as distinct areas of practice, but which have relationships with 
other sites, and have particular resonances for public engagement. They are 
similar, and in many cases, analogous to Munshi  et al’s (2007) categories: (1) 
business/ industrial and technoscience, (2) policy, (3) public affairs media, (4) 
science education (5) civil society organizations, (6) fictive and Web 2.0 forums, 
(7) the social sciences and the humanities and (8) local community. This reading 
of nanotechnology discourses draws from Ted Schatzki’s work on social sites and 
site ontology, where sites are a highly defined set of practices and orders, or 
arrangements of activities and things (Schatzki, 2002). The concept of ‘things’ are 
important in this analysis, as nanotechnology – in all its abstraction – depends on 
objects for visualization and understanding, something tangible to relate it to, 
some ‘thing’ from the real world of objects. Although nanotechnology may 
appear a strange concept to the novice, it is forced into discourses from what 
Nordmann (2005) calls the ‘nuomenal’ otherness that is alien to the world of 
objects. Thus, talk in sites is around harder materials and wearable technologies - 
even nanobots are acceptably alien devices. Sites also have specific ‘locations’ for 
grounding a discourse. The discourse and practices appear to be centralized, 
around a site of particular practices that are only meaningful at that site.  
 
These sites also ground nanotechnology discourses outside the nanoscale 
communities. According to Murphy (2009), nanoscale lab practices, while 
containing distinct discourses, have not been grounded as sites of the social in 
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terms of our public–inclined definition of nanotechnology, focusing rather on the 
multitude of specific technical processes unique to specialist fields (for many 
scientific and technological processes, the concept of nanotechnology has no real 
‘thingness’ about it; also the ‘nano’ word may never even be explicitly 
mentioned. However, see Doubleday (2007) for his work on social organization 
within laboratories and implications for public engagement). Discourse sites are 
explanations of how nanotechnology operates within the social rules of multiple 
contexts, drawn from the philosophy of Heidegger on being and Wittgenstein on 
language-games (Reckwitz, 2002). These sites also require the use of media in the 
everyday.  
 
It is interesting then, in this context, to see how public affairs media cover 
nanotechnology, or to track how nanotechnology becomes a ‘thing’ in mediated 
discourses.1 Each of these methods of slicing off discourses for analysis is useful 
for researchers to see patterns, connections and difference when talking about 
nanotechnology in a new imagined future of the 21st century. There are other 
methods of analyzing media coverage and public engagement which strengthen 
this approach, as described later (see Hornig Priest, 2005, Lewenstein, 2005, and  
Scheufele and Lewenstein, 2005); however, the methodologies just described are 
integral to how the authors  have looked at the different large-scale areas across 
discourses and registers. In the following sections, we look at the main themes 
that emerge across these nodes and sites of discourse regarding nanotechnology.  
 
 
6.145.3 Economy  
 
 
It is worthwhile to look now at the main source of what has reasonably been 
referred to as ‘nanohype’ centred on economy and innovation. In Section 
6.145.7.3 we briefly discuss the ‘frames’ that emerge in nanotechnology 
discourses, ie the constructions that limit discourse. Arguably, there are no larger 
themes running through nanotechnology discourses than those of economic 
promise.  
[cross refs to other chapters in the volume series?] 
It was estimated before the global financial crisis of late 2008 that 
nanotechnology would be worth US $2.6 trillion to the US economy by 2014 
(Lux Research, 2004), predicting the same global economy ‘spiking’ effects as 
caused historically by, electricity, automobiles and integrated circuitry  before it 
(Hullman, 2006). There is speculation that nanotechnology will greatly surpass 
these revolutions because of the predicted transformative effect and multiple 
industries involved. As with the previous hi-tech  waves, nanotechnology enjoys 
high levels of political support in many countries (Allen, 2005;  Lane and Kalil, 
2005) so much so that its spiking effect may be bigger. Nanotechnology has been 
considered a contributor to a way out of global recession through green 
innovation (EuroNanoForum, 2009; Sustainable Development Technology 
Canada, 2009; Safer Nanomaterials and Nanomanufacturing Initiative, 2009) 
while the OECD predicts 2 million new jobs could be created (OECD, 2009) .  
                                                 
1
 Murphy (2009) uses discourse analysis such as that used by Fairclough (2003) and frame 
analysis (Scheufele, 1999;  Gamson, 1992) to do this.  
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Economy and policy interests often frame the industry in terms of global nano-
superpowers (such as US, EU, Russia, China, Korea and India) in competition 
with each other (Hullman, 2006). A report in the Asian Times in 2004 stated that 
China, Korea, and Taiwan had a combined proposed expenditure of US $4 billion 
at that time (Iyengar, 2004). Pre-recession world market forecasts for 
nanotechnology products made in the early 2000s differ wildly, between US $150 
billion and US $2.6 trillion from 2010 and 2014 (ibid.) 
 
Let us now examine some areas of nanotechnology that have economic 
implications, but also with ethical consequences: the tying up of Big Science with 
Big Business, unregulated product development, patenting, and military 
applications.  
 
 
6.145.3.1 Technoscience and Business 
 
 
Although nanotechnology products have begun to leak into the marketplace, as 
we see in the following section, the great predictions that were made early in the 
millennium have not come to pass. Product development is modest compared to 
the hugely central role that was once conceived for business at this stage, from 
vast improvements to existing products to creation of entirely new, almost 
unimaginable, product ranges (Munshi  et al, 2007; Ulrich and Newberry, 2003). 
 
While hi-tech companies and venture capitalists may still be attracted to the 
prestige of nanotechnology, there comes a time when demands are made for 
tangible objects. But talk about the contribution of nanotechnology to the 
economy still dominates. During a period of dramatic downturn in the world’s 
economy, nanotechnology can bring optimism. EuroNanoForum 2009 in Prague 
focused on how nanotechnology would build a sustainable economy for the future 
by exploiting the growing need for sustainable development in European industry 
and society generally, such as the need for reduction in carbon emissions and the 
dependence on fossil fuels as well as the increase in energy demand, pollution 
control and clean water management (EuroNanoForum, 2009). According to a 
Woodrow Wilson Center report on green nanotech, nanotechnology combined 
with green chemistry represents the first stage of a ‘proactive’, rather than 
‘reactive’, approach to solving environmental problems (Schmidt, 2007).  
 
The business potential for nanotechnology has strong links with science policy 
and the rhetoric of technology used for society’s gains, reinforcing the view of 
science being driven by technology and caught up in social and political realities. 
Emerging technology innovation is seen as a kick-starter for economies around 
the world and in many cases S&T funds are the sole survivors in budget cuts. 
Start-up companies with intellectual property in nanotechnology typically have 
one or two key patents (Munshi  et al 2007). 
 
According to Munshi  et al (2007), it was Uldrich and Newberry (2003) who set 
the tone for nano-optimism with their book The Next Big Thing is Really Small 
where they envisaged nanotechnology to be at the core of manufacturing, both 
new products and old relationships between knowledge economy interests and 
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nanotechnology facility developments in shared networks of practices.  As an 
indicator of the cultural resonance of the economic story of nanotechnology, 
several media analysis studies have shown the excessive framing of 
nanotechnology in economic terms, particularly in the US media (Gorss and 
Lewenstein, 2005 ; Schütz and Wiedemann, 2008; Stephens, 2005; Gaskell  et al, 
2005) (see Section 5.145.7.3). In this highly strategic focus, there is a consensus 
on economic benefit, but scant coverage on any kind of risk, whether financial, 
environmental, health or otherwise.  The rationale for investing in 
nanotechnology, and thus communication about the technologies, becomes top-
down in its approach, although, in contrast, Macoubrie (2005) found that public 
opinion reflected the employment cost of this approach – a nanotech-rich future 
would cost jobs. 
 
However, as the 2007 edition of Consumer Reports (Anon. 2007) shows, the 
business nodes of discourse are beginning to ask questions about nanotechnology 
risk. That same year, Business Week also had a significant advertising section 
about nanotechnology which acknowledged that there are risks (McCarthy, 2007).  
 
 
6.145.3.2 Nanoproducts and Society 
 
 
In Section 6.145.7.4 we look at the area of public engagement with 
nanotechnology and how new efforts are being made by nanoscale and higher 
education institutions in this regard. This public engagement includes, at its fullest 
application, public participation in decision-making processes about how and 
what nanoscale products are developed. But there is one fact that is contrarian: 
nanoproducts are already here. 
 
So while we also draw attention later in this chapter to the abstractions of 
nanotechnology discourses, there is a tangibility here as more and more products 
incorporating nanoscale materials are released into the market (to the value of US 
$1.1 trillion in 2007 according to Lux Research (2008), which also 
estimated that there will be US $2.6 trillion dollars of nanotech-enabled 
manufactured products worldwide by 2014). 
 
The National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) website lists several existing 
products which it claims are in the ‘pre-competitive’ stages including: 
 
• Step assists on vans 
• Bumpers on cars 
• Paints and coatings to protect against corrosion,    scratches and radiation 
• Protective and glare-reducing coatings for   eyeglasses and cars 
• Metal-cutting tools 
• Sunscreens and cosmetics 
• Longer-lasting tennis balls 
• Light-weight, stronger tennis racquets 
• Stain-free clothing and mattresses 
• Dental-bonding agent 
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• Burn and wound dressings 
• Ink 
• Automobile catalytic converters 
 
 
Parenthetically, let us note that many of the products currently on the market 
containing nanoparticles do not contain the word ‘nano’ on their labels, for 
instance zinc oxide or titanium dioxide in sunscreens and fullerenes in anti-aging 
creams. With labeling not yet a prerequisite, there are claims that this leaves 
consumers in the dark. 
 
Erickson (2008) however claims that it is incorrect to say that any artifacts have 
been created yet as products of nanotechnology; rather they are products of 
nanoscale research, which has a different set of practical elements and meanings 
depending on the discipline, from material sciences, to electrical or chemical 
engineering, to the computer sciences. But perhaps this is an over-simplified, 
essentialized distinction that denies the power of language and the evolution of 
popular science and scientific communication to the public. For the purposes of 
this chapter then, nanotechnology is nanoscale research, and is presented as a 
constructed term that has both scientific and (albeit limited) public currency. 
 
 
 
6.145.3.3 Patenting Nanoproducts 
 
 
Intellectual property will become more of a minefield in nanotechnoscientific 
fields with the passage of time. The idea for patenting has traditionally been to 
reward invention by controlling disclosure to stimulate innovation within a finite 
period of time. Previously, it had also created a particular relationship between 
governments and the ‘inventor’. However such an individual, and indeed such a 
relationship, rarely exists in today’s nano networks of expertise and innovation, 
because research typically attracts large investment, often from private ventures, 
and so the stakes are higher. 
 
Patent law is strongly challenged by nanotechnology. It forces scientists to set 
boundaries to their work in a lattice of R&D fields that is hard to delineate.  
Bleeker  et al (2004) also draws attention to the fact that the ‘nano’ term may 
boost an applicant’s patentability. A patent however must be adequately 
specialised. According to Bleeker (ibid.), a patentable development in the US 
must ‘meet certain standards of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness (p45)’. The 
issue of size, under this ruling, is ‘obvious’. Nanotechnology also presents a range 
of patenting problems owing to its interdisciplinarity. However, as with regulatory 
issues, how can there be patents where there is no knowledge of direct future use?  
Foundational nanotechnologies may come to have numerous applications.  
 
Another public concern about nanotechnology patenting is the potential for the 
over-commercialization of nature. Patent law for emerging technologies has been 
in the docket before on this matter. For example, in the case of biotechnology, the 
United States Supreme Court decided in 1980 that ‘anything under the sun that is 
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made by man’ to be patentable, including genetically altered microorganisms 
(Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303; Nelkin and Lindee, 2004). Since then 
rice genomes have been patented as well as their ‘promoters’, that is, genetic 
sequences that cause expression. Critics of this patenting system have raised 
concerns over the patenting of what would appear to be processes that occur in 
nature. Although there is subtle modification required in the organism or natural 
process under Diamond v Chakrabarty, ‘discovery’ is enough for genetic 
technologies under the European Patent Convention (EPC), Art 52(2), albeit a 
‘naturally-occurring’ substance needs to be replicated by isolation and synthesis 
for general or specific use, thus a process of extraction is the novel part (Zech, 
2009). Nanotechnology researchers also pride themselves on replicating natural 
processes in their work (as we mention later when discussing framing 
nanotechnology).  Nanotechnologists often say that nanomachines occur in 
nature. It may be inappropriate, though, to utilize macroscale patents for 
nanoscale processes or phenomena selected from an earlier macroscale part of the 
process. What makes it patentable, potentially, are the ‘new and surprising effects 
of the substance’ (ibid. p151). Greener, more sustainable ways of implementing 
nano processes has become another patentable area. For example, a process 
developed in the University of Oregon could assist the synthesis of gold particles 
at room temperature (A to Z of Nanotechnology, 2005; Hutchison, 2005).  
 
Within systems of nanotechnoscience there has emerged the possibility in 
academic research to map out and track the evolution of nanotechnology through 
global nodes of patented activities and products available through web-based 
databases (Li  et al , 2009). The combined geographic, conceptual and 
commercial concept map thus visualized is one of many examples that show how 
the area has taken on a dynamic essence of it own. Among the many questions 
green nanotech patenting raises are fundamental ones about society’s relationship 
to nature, how ownership has become more closely tied to the conservationist 
urges for stewardship. However, history has shown us that patenting systems 
adapt easily to emerging technologies (Bleeker  et al, 2004). The rapid evolution 
of technological processes forces legislative and bureaucratic processes. Let us 
now explore how nanoproducts are being used in the burgeoning industrial-
military complex. 
 
 
6.145.3.4 Military Applications 
 
The US Department of Defense has invested heavily into military uses of 
nanotechnology. The US Department of Defense is the largest investor in the 
NNI, with over 25% of the $1.6 billion total agency investment for 2010 
(National Nanotechnology Initiative, 2009). Nanotechnological development in 
other countries is not synonymous with military application of course, but a 
superpower such as the US has to be wary of the conflation of nanotechnology 
and defense in other countries (Army Environmental Policy Institute, 2005a). 
Indeed, while the nanoscale may be part of the production process or conventional 
weaponry and outfits engineered for combat, there is also the possibility for the 
exploitation of the nanoscale for a new type of warfare (ibid., Army 
Environmental Policy Institute, 2005b). 
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It has become almost inevitable, however, to draw on sci-fi imagery of future war 
when discussing military applications of nanotechnology. Among the uses that 
have been put forward include combat suits and implants that give superhuman 
capabilities to combatants. A dystopian progression of this sci-fi theme of course 
is the possibility of full-scale global war that triggers the grey-goo scenario, a 
conceptual link to nuclear war.   
 
There has long been a fascination in science fiction with military themes – e.g., 
Flash Gordon, Buck Rodgers, Star Wars, Star Trek. The militarization of space, it 
has been argued, came about through these links. Future war and weaponry have a 
strong cultural resonance with the publics who enjoy Hollywood blockbuster 
movies. As we also discuss in Section 6.145.8.1, the relationships between ‘real’ 
war and ‘fiction’ are complex but ultimately traceable.2  While certain movies 
may have anti-war themes on the surface, often military personnel are drafted in 
as advisors, as was the case for the nanotech superhero Iron Man (2008).           
 
The cultural theorist Colin Milburn noticed a very close relationship between the 
world of graphic novel sci-fi and real R&D. In his paper in Intertexts, 
‘Nanowarriors: Military Nanotechnology and Comic Books’, Milburn (2005b) 
noted the striking similarities between an image that was doing the rounds from 
the MIT Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies depicting a female ‘soldier of the 
future’ and a character from the comic book Radix.  MIT’s soldier was a serious 
proposal, the project having been awarded US$50 million from the Army 
Research Office (ibid.). The image became well publicized, appearing on 
websites, press releases and magazines.3 
 
 
Section Section 6.145.8.1 provides detail on the Hollywood representations of 
nanotechnology. There is, however, one movie worth mentioning here: GI Joe: 
Rise of the Cobra, in production in early 2009 and widely anticipated by bloggers 
(slashfilm.com, 2008; generalsjoes.com, 2009; firstshowing.net, 2009). An article 
called ‘Five Reasons Why GI Joe Could Actually Be Cool’ has been circulated 
widely over a year before release among discussion forums (slashfilm.com, 
2008). The five reasons involve a range of smart features on future soldier 
uniforms such as accelerator suits, nano bombs and ‘nanite’ masks.  There are 
power implications in how the military prestige becomes translated to the screen. 
What Milburn describes is the blurring of fictional narratives and technological 
advance. 
 
Both of these examples, GI Joe and Radix, show the shared military – industrial 
imaginaries of nanotechnology for a future hero. The current trend in Hollywood 
                                                 
2
 For a poststructuralist view of how technology, fiction and war have become intertwined, see 
Jean Baudrillard's (1995) The Gulf War Did Not Take Place. 
 
3
 An interesting epilogue is that MIT had to remove the image following a lawsuit threatened by 
the creators of the Radix character.  Milburn (2005b) demonstrates the complex discourse that 
took place between lawyers about what constitutes fact and what constitutes fiction in 
nanotechnology as well as how MIT’s use might negate the fantasy of a comic book. 
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for futurized comic book heroes aligns itself well with the mythic qualities of a 
nation-state superhero from our ‘real’ projected futures. 4 
 
Whatever the cultural intricacies of ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’, as explored in the 
penultimate section, it is the recurring public concerns over transparency and trust 
that keep emerging in these discourses. There are compelling cases being made to 
consider, perhaps more carefully than other technologies, corporate responsibility 
for nanotechnology.  
 
 
6.145.4 Ecology 
 
 
The relationships between nanotechnology and ecology are complex, but there are 
two main opposing views, two loci of discourse: 
 
a) Nanotechnology will help the environment, and in more optimistic 
readings, it has even been expected to reverse climate change. 
b) Nanotechnology is harmful to the environment because of its 
unpredictability, specifically the relatively manageable threat of 
nanoparticles but also on a more fundamental scale, the threat to all 
life through perceived ‘nano-goo’ theories etc.   
 
These two views are over-simplifications, but they are representative of the 
polarized utopian/dystopian worldviews. Let us first consider the implications of 
nanotechnology for the environment. 
 
 
6.145.4.1 Nanotechnology and the Environment 
Many chapters in this volume series have either outlined or shown in some detail 
the environmental potential for nanotechnology, regarding monitoring and 
treatment. [cross refs to other chapters in the volume series?]. Examples of 
‘green nanotech’ include: 
• increasing research interest in the use of nanoscale environmental 
sensors for the detection of biotic compounds in seawater or 
drinking water; 
• nanoparticles used for waste remediation; 
• precision farming where computers, global satellite positioning 
systems, and remote sensing devices measure local environmental 
conditions for agro-efficiency during seeding, fertilizer sprays, 
watering, and harvesting (Joseph and Morrison, 2006); 
• photovoltaics and other compact energy sources for expected 
cheaper more efficient fuel production; 
                                                 
4
 British political scientist Sean Howard (2002) has proposed an “Inner Space Treaty” in 
2002 to limit military uses of nanotechnology, similar to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.  
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• more controversial geo-engineering projects where, through 
nanotechnological processes, large scale ‘terra-forming’ of the 
planet reduces sunlight and /or carbon emission to combat global 
warming; 
• cerium oxide nanomaterials which can combat diesel emissions, 
while iron materials have been used to remove contaminants from 
soils and groundwater (Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.), 
2007).  
These applications all reinforce the ‘green growth’ narrative. In contrast, the 
number of studies on the potential negative environmental impact of 
nanomaterials remains quite low (Anderson  et al, 2009), although it has increased 
in the last five years. In fact much of today’s nanotechnology R&D requires 
environmental impact analysis, which began to come about in the mid-2000s 
when public concerns became more prominent about the safety of 
nanotechnology.   
There is general scientific consensus that one unique feature of working on the 
nanoscale, where atoms and atomic clusters are put together, is that the physical 
properties of objects behave differently than on the microscale or larger. 
However, the degree of uncertainties about health and environmental impact has 
caused some concern.  Not only do these uncertainties apply to public 
expectation, but they also apply to engineers themselves working at the nanoscale, 
or close to the nanoscale. Concerns have arisen about, for example, the potential 
toxicity and environmental impact of nanoscale materials in food and healthcare. 
Smaller particles, particularly where there is potentially high surface area per unit 
mass and surface reactivity, have potential environmental and health implications.  
If the types of technology under discussion here are as prevalent as mooted, then 
there can be certain assurances that the future will see a large amount of 
nanoparticles of one type or another released in the environment, through waste 
seepage, leachates, waste water and air. Environmental treatment currently using 
nanomaterials, such as groundwater remediation, demonstrate that such 
nanoparticles do not safely agglomerate (Oberdorster  et al, 2007; Tratnyek and 
Johnson, 2006). It is necessary then to track and record the transport and likely 
fate of such particles, which organisms are most at risk and the patterns of biotic 
accumulation. The behavior and fate of colloids, which are stable suspensions of 
organic and inorganic particles of 1 and 1000 nm diameter, appear commonly in 
the literature because of their role as effective transport vehicles for contaminant 
treatment in subsurface environments (Oberdorster  et al, 2007, citing McCarthy 
and Zachara, 1989). The full complexity of soil and water science regarding 
colloids is only now being registered, much of it centering around particle and soil 
mobility (Oberdorster  et al, 2007). The only part-consensus that can be formed 
for colloids is that they are poorly understood (ibid.) (See also Sealy (2006) for a 
starting point on the converging studies of the environmental health risk of 
amyloidal proteins.) 
There have been many international strategies and initiatives to determine health 
and environmental risks and hazards associated with nanoscale materials as well 
as with other related concerns based on scientific evidence. The National 
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Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), discussed more in Section 6.145.7.1, received 
$1.6 billion from the 2010 US Budget, and has its own EHS oversight program. 
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Pew Charitable 
Trusts began the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies (PEN) (Sandler, 2009) 
while UNESCO (2006) issued a report from its Social and Human Sciences 
program. Also on the research side, a report of the Royal Society and the Royal 
Academy of Engineering (UK) from 2004 is one of the most cited documents, but 
there is also the 2008 report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(UK). There are various international groups including the International Risk 
Governance Council (IRGC) (2005) and the International Council on 
Nanotechnology (ICON) (2009).  
The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) (2006, 2007) set up an 
independent Working Group on Nanotechnology in response to the need for a 
cross-disciplinary approach to nanotechnology risks and hazards.  This body has 
also conducted a series of international surveys with stakeholders on the 
implications of the technologies. The Council has defined two frames of reference 
for the four generations of nanostructures that impact on how toxicity levels are 
examined. Frame One, or the ‘passive’ frame concerns those components of 
existing products that do not constitute excessive risk due to their stable behavior. 
Passive nanostructures are mainly first generation. Frame Two, or the ‘active’ 
frame, consists of second generation (active nanostructures), third generation 
(complex nanosystems), and fourth generation (molecular nanosystems) structures 
that also change the design and development of the existing ones and so their 
behavior becomes less easy to predict (ibid.).  
There have been a number of major EU reports setting the agenda for detecting 
health and environmental risk (European Commission, 2004a, 2007) as well as 
the references in the EU Nanotechnology Action Plan (European Commission, 
2005) and several special committee reports on emerging health risks from new 
chemical exposure and product safety. Nanotechnology is also mentioned in the 
EU Strategy for Environment and Health (European Commission, 2003), although 
not in the subsequent Environment and Health Action plan (European 
Commission, 2004b). On the highest level, the European Parliament (European 
Parliament Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, 2009) 
and European Council (European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies to the European Commission, 2007) are seeking regulation, and 
environmental concerns have risen to the fore.  
Much of the generalized scientific discourses about the environmental and health 
implications of nanotechnology are focused on both risks and benefits.  Scholars 
at the Woodrow Wilson Center are trying to come to terms with the complexities: 
according to Davies (2009), current health and environmental agencies are unable 
to assess the risks of nanoparticles within the standard oversight models of risk 
assessment. The Center recommends that laws be changed to account for future 
unknowable technologies, as well as a new governmental body be created to not 
only look after ‘environmental protection’ in the old sense but also integrate 
technology assessment, forecasting, and health and safety monitoring. 
 
 
 19 
Now let us consider the larger scale threat that is the Drexlerian vision of 
nanotechnological geoengineering, or terra-forming, where the smallest 
technology is proposed to be employed to effect large-scale planetary changes. 
The Center for Responsible Nanotechnology (2008) in particular proposes a role 
for molecular manufacturing in combating climate change, techniques such as 
controlling the sun’s rays by increasing nano-emissions. In Section 6.145.7.3 we 
take a look at the social theoretical and media analysis reading of such 
projections— the framing linguistic devices used in emphasizing the need for 
greater mastery of nature. Such predictions and ‘imagineering’ opens up a whole 
set of ethical questions about what societies intend to do with new and emerging 
technologies, who governs science and how, and to what ends, making it a 
worthwhile exercise to map out the tropes of technology as servant, leader or 
peer. 
 
Questions are often raised about the public awareness and use of scientific and 
technological knowledge regarding environmental risk. As Wynne and many 
other sociologists and science communication experts point out, of public 
concerns cannot merely be considered to be borne out of irrational fears or 
ignorance (see especially Wynne, 1992) Cultural understanding of the publics’ 
reaction to nanoparticles and safety is required, looking at existing fears of the 
unknown and unseen as well as general consumer behavior in response to toxicity 
risk. 
 
Yet current research from the sociological end of science and risk communication 
would suggest that the blurring of the lines between risk and hazard is a very 
human part of the cognitive process, and must be accepted on its own terms for 
effective communications. Peter Sandman (1993) suggests that risk should be 
considered a sum of objective hazard assessment and subjective ‘outrage’ factors, 
many of which are emotive and need to be understood in these terms.  
 
Strange as it may seem, it was the case of Brian Wynne’s famous Cumbrian sheep 
farmers that informs much of contemporary sociological studies of risk 
communication. In an influential paper published in the late 1990s, considered a 
landmark in science communication and STS research, Wynne presents the case 
for how publics can construct active and sophisticated responses to scientific risk 
information, responses that are often lost to scientific and authoritarian reasoning 
Wynne (1992)  Following the Chernobyl nuclear incident in Kiev in 1986, sheep 
farmers near the Sellafield (formerly Windscale) nuclear fuels plant in the Lake 
District of Cumbria, Northern England, were informed by Government-appointed 
experts not to use the land for pasture, despite earlier reports that there was no 
radioactive contamination in the area. Sellafield, of course, has its own history of 
conflict between nearby Ireland and other regions of the UK beyond Cumbria. 
What Wynne builds up in his ethnographic analysis is a story of powerful social 
networks where there is much to be contested: scientists’ testimonies against 
farmers, ‘lay knowledge’ of science, radioactive measurement methods (proven 
later to be inaccurate), and the relationships between the local community and a  
major institutional employer such as the Sellafield nuclear fuels plant. There was 
a multitude of channels of information flow entirely dependent on the context of 
this particular controversy, and all with implications associated with the inequity 
of power and authority.  Informed by contemporary science and technology 
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studies of public reception, the publication of Wynne’s paper was one of the 
seminal moments for understanding the power of context and social identities, or 
representations of identity in debate, for controversial scientific information and 
the environment.  
Within scientific discourses, characterizations of exposure, hazard and risk to 
nanoparticles tend to focus on the monitoring of intentional release. For instance 
zero-valent iron—iron particles purposefully released for groundwater 
contaminant remediation—can be tracked and exposure concentrations 
determined (Center for Groundwater Research, 2009). However, there is a large 
bulk of unidentified domestic and industrial nanoparticles from sources than 
cannot be easily identified. Scientific risk assessment therefore depends upon 
identification of the different types of nanoparticles most prevalent in the 
environment (Oberdorster  et al, 2007). 
Scientific disagreements about the breadth and scope of nanotoxicology studies 
exist. There is a view that current definitions of nanomaterials may be too narrow 
for food toxicology, given that there is such a variety, as presented to the UK 
Parliament in June 2009 by expert witnesses (www.parliament.uk, 2009). In fact, 
the European Parliament’s (European Parliament Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety, 2009) communication on nanotechnology 
explicitly contradicts the earlier findings of the European Commission report 
(European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European 
Commission, 2007), stating the report is ‘misleading’ in its representation of a 
possible market without adequate data on implications. This would appear to be a 
significant shift at the higher levels of European politics towards addressing EHS 
issues. While the 2004 report of the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of 
Engineering had similar misgivings about approving of nanotechnology carte 
blanche, both reports suggest a multidisciplinary approach to risk assessment. 
This approach, it has been acknowledged, includes a perspective from humanities 
and social sciences. The next section looks at the broad sociological landscape, 
particular from critical theory, of public discourse on ecology and risk.  
 
 
6.145.4.2 Nature, Technology and Public Discourse 
 
 
The discussion so far has focused primarily on the expert discourses of ecological 
risk from scientific communities. By invoking the sociological writings of Beck, 
Wynne and Giddens in the discussion however, we recognize, as do scientific 
discourses, that other forms of expertise are required to contribute to the 
knowledge systems of nanotechnology (Royal Society and the Royal Academy of 
Engineering, 2004; Toumey, 2007). There has been much written within the ‘late 
modernity’ literature about how society responds to ideas of science and nature 
outside of scientific practices (Giddens, 1991; MacNaghten  et al, 2005a, 2005b; 
Nowotny  et al 2002; Wynne, 1992). There are key concepts about where 
publics—humans—see themselves in relation to science, technology and nature; 
conquering, preserving or submitting to nature. There are future-orientated tropes 
mapping humanity’s place in ecology, future health and human longevity/ 
enhancement in modern cultures of therapy.  
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Ecological politics was born out of the 1960s countercultural resistance to Big 
Science and industrial modernity, symbolized by Rachel Carson’s (1987) Silent 
Spring. However, where once mobilization of ecology social movements was 
counter-cultural, now, in addition to political action by Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs), green thinking has become mainstream and institutional 
(Eder, 1996a). Hajer (1995a),  Eder (1996a, 1996b) and many others have looked 
at this politicization of ecology. We are seeing an embedding of ecology into 
social processes, in politics (as political ecology), in business and aspects of 
everyday life. Eder (1996b) has called it a ‘masterframe’ of ecologism within 
society. 
 
The framing of nanotechnology as nature is a recent manifestation of the ecology 
masterframe. There is a common phrase throughout nanoscience text books that 
nanotechnology is ‘replicating nature’; often, there is a more optimistic claim that 
it may well better nature. This is the storyline that adds to the power of 
nanotechnology – humans in control of nature beyond imagination. Such is its 
power that it is difficult to construct a theory of how technology and society will 
exist, particularly given the challenges such expected transformations pose for 
traditional social theory and the fact that future imagineering is happening in 
small communities removed from most publics (Dunkley, 2004). Such divinations 
of nanotechnology in society are tied up with other emerging technosciences, such 
as biotechnology. In the framing studies of Eder and Hajer, we can draw historical 
parallels with other facets of ecological modernization, such as advocates and 
resistances to nuclear energy and genetically modified organisms. STS studies 
inform us too that public input into institutional science is inevitable at some level 
in late modernity. We can also learn from Habermas’ critical theory of how 
discourse of technology is represented in the public sphere or the technological 
ethics of Hans Jonas. Jonas was not speaking directly about nanotechnology in the 
following 1984 passage, but the new emerging technologies surely prove his point 
more than ever before: 
 
Modern technology, informed by an ever deeper 
penetration of nature and propelled by the forces of market 
and politics, has enhanced human power beyond anything 
known or even dreamed of before. It is a power over 
matter, over life on earth, and over man himself; and it 
keeps growing at an accelerating pace (Jonas, 1984 p.ix). 
 
Response and resistance to socioscientific strategies tend to have social 
movements as actors, specifically community-based responses, as we look at in 
Section 6.145.4.3. In Section 6.145.7.4 we explore the political dimension further 
for nanotechnology by asking questions about the role of deliberative and 
aggregate democracy in the use of, and in policy-making around, this new and 
emerging technology. 
 
 
6.145.4.3 NGOs and Local Communities 
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Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) have begun to emerge in opposition to 
nanotechnology, although perhaps not (yet) with the same intensity as for other 
emerging technologies such as genetic modification of crops and animals. The 
Big Down report from the Action Group on Erosion, Technology, and 
Concentration (ETC Group, 2003) was a direct source for Prince Charles’ famous 
negative assessment of nanotechnology in 2003. A group calling itself ‘THONG’ 
(Topless Humans Organized for Natural Genetics) staged semi-nude 
demonstrations at large nanotechnology events in the mid-2000s. Friends of the 
Earth has produced briefing papers about the potential risk of nanotechnology, 
while Nanotechnology Citizen Engagement Organization (NanoCEO, 2009), a 
US-based group, has organized a series of ‘Nano Cafes’. Greenpeace was an 
active participant in a series of workshops with nano industry panelists in 2007, 
organized by Demos, a UK-based think tank on democracy (Demos, 2009). 
 
What emerges strongly from these representations, particularly those in the recent 
past which have taken on board public value issues that writers such as Alan Irwin 
(2006) and Brian Wynne (1992, 2005) describe, is a need to address other forms 
of risk and varying perspectives of the public good in an era of responsible 
innovation, whether it be for healthcare, materials production, electronics or other 
commercial venture (see in particular Sandler, 2009 and Rip, 2006).  
 
Despite the existence of some valuable resistance and commentary from NGOs 
about nanomaterials, it might be argued that there have not been, as yet, grounded 
discourses at community level about nanotechnology. It is not yet an 
environmental health issue on large scale public consciousness level. Nano talk 
may well be driven at this stage by natural and social sciences, with some NGOs, 
and with commercial imperatives underpinning all efforts.  
 
 
6.145.5 Health    
 
 
6.145.5.1 Nanotechnology and Health 
 
As with the effects of nanotechnology on the environment, the impact of this new 
technology on healthcare is polarized. On the one hand, nanomedicine offers 
opportunities to advance treatments for a range of disorders including 
cardiovascular and neurodegenerative diseases, cancers, diabetes, and 
musculoskeletal disorders among others (European Technology Platform, 2006); 
on the other, there is increasing scientific evidence of some degree of health risk 
associated with nanostructures. There are many factors that are either difficult or 
impossible to measure regarding nanoparticle concentration levels and exposure 
rates; however some toxicology studies show potential risk for respiratory and 
immune systems, and  some carcinogenic effects  (Anderson  et al, 2009 citing     
Handy and Shaw, 2007 and Hannah and Thompson, 2008). 
Let us first deal with the positive narratives of the emerging field of nanomedicine 
and nanobiotechnology.  While the extrinsic discourse of news media and fiction 
often refers to nanobots, the intrinsic discourse downplays this supposed sci-fi 
aspect. There is some research on nanomaterials’ ability to enter cells, which has 
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therapeutic potential––for example, to manage pathogens using silver 
nanoparticles (Baker  et al. 2005), to treat tumor cells using hematite (Ito  et al. 
2004), and to use polymers to reduce the side effects of chemotherapies (Vicent & 
Duncan 2006). The European Technology Platform on Nanomedicine (2006) is a 
strategic alliance between the European Commission and industry which 
coordinates research and clinical efforts towards (i) targeted drug delivery, which 
includes nanobiomolecular processes such as impalefection or the use of 
nanoparticles for gene delivery; (ii) biodiagnostics, the identification of disease at 
the very early stages; and (iii) regenerative medicine to overcome organ or tissue 
failure.  
There has, however, also been a significant increase in scientific publications on 
negative implications on health, as we discuss next. 
6.145.5.2 Nanotoxicity 
Donaldson  et al (2004) coined the term ‘nanotoxicology’ in 2004. It has since 
become a sub-field in itself looking at the science of nanoparticle toxicity, with a 
dedicated scientific journal, Nanotoxicology, published since 2007. Fadeel  et al 
(2007) state in their overview in the first edition: 
The very same properties that make engineered 
nanomaterials so promising from a technological 
perspective, such as their high degree of reactivity 
and the ability to cross biological barriers, could 
also make these novel materials harmful to human 
health and the environment (ibid., p73) 
A recent NATO workshop has summarized what it called the ‘wide-scale’ risk/ 
benefit issues associated with nanoparticles as well as the societal dimensions of 
such issues (Linkov  et al 2008). As we broaden out the discussion further, we 
want to emphasize here how these ‘societal dimensions’ are not necessarily 
secondary to the issues, but integral to public construction of risk. But let us first 
focus on scientific health risk. 
Many articles on the toxicity of nanoparticles have been published in the Journal 
of Nanoparticle Research. Other environmental health journals have published 
reports of toxicological research on colloids (Oberdorster  et al, 2007; McCarthy 
and Zachara, 1989) and amyloids (Sealy, 2006). Health risks associated with 
nanoparticles have historically been investigated by conventional particulate 
toxicology on the nanoscale. Certainly there are naturally occurring nanoparticles, 
such as volcanic dust or certain bacterial or mineral composites, in the 
environment. The sources of contamination have also been identified as 
consequences of mass production and transport, as well as spillages and waste 
associated with nanoparticle-containing consumer products such as cosmetics and 
industrial waste (Albrecht  et al 2006, citing G. Oberdorster,  et al 2005). There 
are other materials labeled high-risk such as asbestos or silica (Oberdorster  et al, 
2007). There are also particulate behavior studies contributing to overall 
knowledge from virology, and from the toxicology of air pollution particles below 
10 µm in size (ibid.), termed invariably by research communities as ‘ultrafines’ or 
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‘incidental’ nanoparticles, by-products of macro processes of production. Early 
studies showed rats exposed for 30 minutes to 20 nm polytetrafluoroethylene 
ultrafine concentrations of 106 particles cm-3 died within 4 hours. Other streams 
of information contributing to a larger toxicology picture come from genetic and 
epidemiological disciplines, for instance, genetic preposition for respiratory and 
cardiovascular illnesses. 
The traditional types of nanoparticles —natural and incidental—are often 
distinguished from what are termed ‘newly engineered’ nanoparticles, which 
include dendrimers, quantum dots, carbon nanotubes and metallic nanoparticles. 
These are the new products of nanotechnology. Much of what is known about 
engineered nanoparticles has been learned form the study of natural and incidental 
particulates. There is an opinion, however, that nanoparticulates represent a whole 
new area of toxicology. An important element for characterising nanoparticles 
and their toxicology is studying states of agglomeration (particles coagulation 
after turbulence in liquids or gases) and aggregation (particle attraction through 
van der Waals forces) (Oberdorster et al, 2007) 
These days, researchers look at how nanoparticles represent hazards to human and 
other mammalian tissue. For example, Shvedova  et al (2008) have found that 
single walled carbon nanotubes can impact adversely on mice lungs when inhaled. 
Many scientific studies show that nanoparticles have the propensity to cross cell 
barriers and interact with cellular structures. This phenomenon can produce many 
potential benefits for therapeutic and diagnostic procedures in biomedicine. 
However, in addition to other factors, the significantly small size and its relation 
to surface area have implications for mammalian tissue (ibid.). There is a 
particular concern for crossing the blood/brain barrier. This appears to be the case 
for a large range of nanomaterials including carbon nanotubes, metal 
nanoparticles, fullerenes and quantum dots. Oberdorster  et al (2007) have 
indicated that many of the toxicology studies in rodents and cell lines have used 
agglomerated and aggregated rather than mono-dispersed particles, and such 
studies indicate that even in the agglomerated forms the smaller particles are more 
potent than previously expected. There are many questions raised by the 
occupational aspects of nanotechnology (National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health, 2009), the primary one being as follows: if there is to be a 
large nano-industry and little current regulation (Section 6.145.7), how are those 
nano-researchers being protected (Maynard, 2007)? Where some broad consensus 
seems to have emerged is not on nanoparticle dosage—where a ‘no observed 
adverse effect level’ system , or NOAEL, is applied by regulatory agencies such 
as the US Environmental Protection Agency, which assumes that everything at a 
certain dosage level is harmful—but on observing particle surface area 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2007).  However, as Maynard stresses, ‘we 
can no longer rely on hazard evaluations, risk assessments or regulations that are 
based on our understanding of chemicals alone’ (p3). 
 
 
6.145.6 Equity 
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Having briefly addressed scientific risk concerns, let us now turn to issues of 
nanotechnology that are closely related to health, environmental and personal 
well-being. A central concern around new and emerging technologies is the extent 
to which they serve and reinforce ideological, political, social, cultural and 
gendered interests. Emergent nanotechnology research and applications raise 
fundamental questions about the risks they potentially pose to privacy, identities, 
and gender equity, while exacerbating the nano-divide between the developing 
and the developed world. In addition, the control of intellectual property of 
nanotechnology  applications, devices and manufacturing processes is being 
driven by large corporations and laboratories based primarily in the First World, 
which has significant economic implications for the developing world. Who gets 
access to nanoscale technologies and at what price is an issue of fundamental 
importance for equity considerations of nanotechnology.  There has been very 
little substantive attention given to these issues, although these concerns are now 
gaining some visibility in the scholarship and in the reports written by 
environmental and other NGOs.  
 
 
6.145.6.1 Global Equity and Rights : Implications for Developing 
Countries 
 
The concern about a nano-divide between First and Third World countries, 
marking a growing gap between those with advanced nanotechnologies and those 
without, has been voiced by development agencies and activists. Such a gap could 
be widened if resources are poured into profit generating consumer products 
rather than into technologies and applications that could alleviate poverty and 
promote development in Third World countries (see Association for Women’s 
Rights in Development (AWID), 2004). Indeed, it is precisely such imperatives 
that drive the global pharmaceutical industry resulting in a focus on producing 
innumerable over-the-counter products for wealthier nations rather than ensuring 
access to essential, life-saving drugs for poorer ones. Recognizing the potential 
for nanotechnology to create winners and losers in both national and international 
contexts, scholars such as Baird and Vogt (2004) ask whether nanotechnology  
 
will address the most urgent problems of developing 
countries (energy, clean water, food) or just accept a 
‘global nanodivide’ as we have come to live with a ‘digital 
and genetic divide’ (p393). 
 
The concerns about the negative impacts of nanotechnology on marginalized 
communities, voiced most cogently by the ETC Group (2003), are countered by 
others who point out that nanotechnology applications can become the means to 
achieve the United Nations Millennium Development Goals  (see, for example, 
Salamanca-Buentello  et al., 2005; United Nations Millennium Project, 2005). 
Thus, the United Nations Millennium Project report (ibid.) states that 
nanotechnology and biotechnology will combine for such diverse applications as 
environmental and health technologies as water treatment and remediation, energy 
storage, production, and conversion; disease diagnosis and screening; drug 
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delivery systems; health monitoring; air pollution and remediation; food 
processing and storage; vector and pest detection and control; and agricultural 
productivity enhancement.  
 
Although the same report cautions that, given their potential for causing 
environmental and other harms,  such technologies need to be developed with 
care, there is an overwhelmingly techno-utopian edge to the discussion of the 
development possibilities—such as, wealth, health, and other improvements—that 
nanotechnology appears to open up. The ETC Group (2006) addresses in detail 
the significant negative implications of nanotechnology for the most marginalized 
communities. It points out that nanotechnology can radically transform the 
manufacturing process, with the creation from scratch of smaller, cheaper 
products that require fewer raw materials. Nanotechnology’s new designer 
materials could topple commodity markets, disrupt trade and eliminate jobs. 
Worker-displacement brought on by commodity obsolescence will hurt the 
poorest and most vulnerable, particularly those workers in the developing world 
who do not have the economic flexibility to respond to sudden demands for new 
skills or different raw materials (ibid, p. viii). There are clearly major 
contributions that nanotechnology can make to address current inequities. The 
provision of clean drinking water, cheap energy, health benefits, and a cleaner 
environment are all desirable and important goals that deserve support. Yet it is 
important to note that in the face of the privatization of science, the concentration 
of resources in the hands of a few powerful actors, and a context where 
governments align too easily with the corporate sector, the desire for profit at the 
expense of human needs is likely to prevail. There is little evidence to indicate 
either the ability or the desire of governments to regulate nanotechnology in a 
way that ensures democratic control for the public good. 
 
 
6.145.6.2 Power 
 
As has been described in the last section, what has been particularly forceful 
about nanotechnology is its global reach. The framing of nanotechnology makes it 
truly international as well as systems and strategy-oriented.  There are global 
threats, not just in the acute sense that there may be ‘ecophagy’ (Foresight 
Institute, 2000) or assemblers running amok, but regarding the politics of science 
and technology governance. The structures of democratic and/or participative 
processes are being examined in relation to nanotechnology. Nanotechnology has 
been considered a test case for public engagement and involvement in science 
policy and the narratives of science. Many see this as learning from the mistakes 
leading to miscommunication and mistrust that followed the genetic modification 
debates (Gaskell, 2003). 
 
But there are other questions for the legitimization of nanoscientific research . In 
charting a map of the nanoworld, Munshi et al (2007) show how  
 
power plays out in the core struggles to not only define 
what constitutes nanotechnology but also around the 
ways in which the field should be developed and 
regulated (p446).  
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Dominant power rests with the nanoscientists/engineers, industry and the state. 
The decisions on the definitional aspects of nanotechnology rests with 
technoscientists and the decisions by states and the private sector to secure 
millions of dollars for nanotechnoscientific research and applications are aligned 
with the strategic influence that comes with definitional power. This strategic 
alliance is hardly power neutral as is revealed by the little more than superficial 
concern for ethical, social and equity issues in the dominant discourses around 
nanotechnology.  
 
The need to increase the visibility of nanotechnological concepts in education has 
been identified by several scholars (Lakhtakia, 2005; Lightfeather, 2006; 
Madhavan  et al., 2006; Swinney and Seal, 2008). Mass education may not 
eliminate the power inequities inherent in a situation where research and funding 
decisions are transforming societies without any active involvement of multiple 
publics, including and especially the most marginalized voices and communities. 
However, in time education may lessen the impacts of power inequities, 
particularly if these inequities are made explicit as part of the teaching.  
 
 
6.145.6.3 Identity 
 
For many environmental activists, inequities around new technologies are not just 
about human survival but also about, as McKibben (2003) puts it, ‘our identity’.  
As the subtitle of McKibben’s (2003) book indicates, the challenge of our times is 
‘staying human in an engineered age’. The claims of technoscientists about 
nanotechnology’s capacity to alter every aspect of existence has opened up the 
potential for what Fukuyama (2002) and many others have called a posthuman 
future—a future that goes beyond that of cyborgs but that with a potential to 
radically alter conceptions of what it is to be human.  If we are at the advent of a 
posthuman age, nanotechnology is beginning to usher this in, affecting issues of 
identity and privacy.  Writers such as Hayles (2004) and Milburn (2002, 2005a, 
2005b) feel the future is here in our collective cultural gaze. From postructuralist 
readings and the social theory of Foucault, the scope of ‘nanotechnology and 
identity’ can be described as seeing and feeling a nanoworld through media, 
cultural imagery of marketing and advertising, and Hollywood. Identity becomes 
caught in the  biopolitics of things, networks and places, and while it may seem a 
threat to many, identity is in a constant state of ‘becoming’, as the power of 
constant nano-gaze forces normative action, a change in practices and behaviors. 
Donna Haraway (1988) also paints this technoscientific landscape, a space where 
the emergent practices of information, communication technologies, 
nanotechnology and genetic engineering always has gendered implications. 
 
 
6.145.6.4 Gender 
 
Technology is more than a set of physical objects or 
artifacts. It also fundamentally embodies a culture or 
set of social relations made up of certain sorts of 
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knowledge, beliefs, desires and practices (Wajcman, 
1991, p. 149).  
 
Feminist perspectives on technology have been driven by a recognition that both 
technology and gender are socially constructed, and are embedded in ideologies, 
worldviews, and configurations of power that have implications for the material 
worlds we live in. Feminists have long argued that the transformative power of 
technology can reinforce traditional gender patterns of power and authority or re-
envision how gender is played out on numerous social, political, economic and 
other fronts (see, for example, Cockburn, 1983, 1985; Wajcman, 1991; Balsamo, 
1996; Ong and Collier, 2005). In theorizing the link between gender and 
technology, feminist technology studies (FTS) scholars have argued, first, that 
gender and technology mutually influence each other, whereby technology ‘is 
both a source and consequence of gender relations and vice versa’ (Faulkner, 
2001, p81). Second, FTS scholars have drawn on the triad proposed by Harding 
(1986) and Scott (1988) to analyze gender-technology relations, namely 
 
of gender structures (e.g., occupations, education), 
gender symbolism (e.g., cultural associations between 
masculinity and technology), and gender identity (how 
people see themselves as women and men) (Faulkner, 
2000, p90).  
 
Although each node of this triad has relevance for a specific examination of the 
gender implications of nanotechnology, little scholarly attention has been paid to 
this issue. For example, the extraordinary range of nanotechnology developments 
hold significant gender implications, from gold nanoshells that identify cancer 
cells for destruction to targeted delivery of drugs to specific parts of the body, to 
the possibilities for human performance enhancement technologies, and all of 
which remain to be explored in their specificities in feminist scholarship.  
  
The Association of Women’s Rights in Development (2004) has called for the 
consideration of gender equality and women’s human rights early in the process 
of nanotechnology development by asking the following questions: 
 
• What are the effects of these nanotechnologies on women’s bodies 
and reproduction? 
• What are their effects on women’s work? 
• How can women’s rights be supported by these technologies, if at 
all? 
• What do we need to know about these technologies to guarantee 
women’s rights are not undermined? (AWID, 2004, p. 4) 
 
Although answers to these critical questions remain to be addressed, NGOs and 
women’s health advocates have focused attention on some new nano applications 
being developed that are of special significance for women. The Global Campaign 
for Microbicides, for example, advocates the development and use of 
microbicides—a new type of product that aims to prevent or reduce the 
transmission of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases through topical 
application—because it could ‘put safe, affordable and accessible protection into 
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the hands of women’ (ETC Group, 2006, p32; Global Campaign for Microbicides, 
2009). In a cogent discussion of the implications of the vaginal microbicide 
‘Vivagel’, which uses nanoscale molecules and is currently going through human 
trials, the ETC Group points out that the ‘development of a microbicide, which is 
replicable, sustains a good shelf life and is attractive to users, will require an 
estimated US $600 million over the next 10 years’ (ibid., p. 34). This must be 
seen in the context of a cheap, simple technology of AIDS prevention—the 
condom—which is easy to store and distribute, but remains in short supply 
because of funding shortfalls from OECD countries. Reports from the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, and the major public-private-
partnerships involving the Gates Foundation and other wealthy corporate sources, 
indicate the extent of failure in the fight against malaria, tuberculosis and other 
preventable diseases. The case of the global program to fight malaria, where the 
technology involved is cheap—that is, treated mosquito netting, insecticides, and 
medicines—is particularly striking for its failure to deliver on its promises. 
Hence, it is important to caution that blind faith in the ability of nanomedicines to 
cure the diseases rampant in the Third World, is unlikely to materialize unless 
fundamental structural issues of equity and justice are addressed.  
 
In the context of gender, new technologies and development, Darling (2006) 
argues that  
 
progress on social justice and the social norms which 
are embedded in a public domain is increasingly being 
sacrificed to legal- and market-based norms in the new 
genomics-based consumerism that defines the current 
new and emerging technologies (p  ).  
 
Indeed, from the perspective of women, a fundamental issue in the access and use 
of new technologies such as microbicides is that of gender power and inequality. 
The Global Campaign for Microbicides (2009) argues that unlike with the 
condom, the microbicide can be used by women directly and thus can empower 
them to protect themselves from unsafe sex and have greater control over their 
sexual health and fertility.  Others, however, raise questions around safety issues 
of microbicides which could result in using vulnerable women as guinea pigs in 
clinical trials, while diverting attention and resources from other areas of 
women’s empowerment that could give them greater economic independence and 
enhance their ability to negotiate control over their lives. The tension between the 
desire for a silver bullet of nanotechnology to address what are ultimately deep-
rooted structural problems of inequity and injustice thus remains to be resolved. 
 
 
6.145.6.5 Privacy 
 
In this section we follow a common view on the ethics of surveillance, which 
could potentially see the panoptic side of nanotechnology, following the 
poststructuralist theorist Michel Foucault (Foresight Institute, 2009).  The 
panopticon was an extreme Big Brother vision by Jeremy Bentham for 
prisoners—a central observation space connecting up to glass walls on every 
surrounding cell within a prison where all prisoners could be visible to a single 
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guard, thus increasing surveillance and decreasing both labor costs and privacy; 
fear of and future surveillance by the state have been captured in Orwell’s 1984 
and more recently, The Manchurian Candidate (2004). 
 
Several strands of nanotechnology may interlink to provide a point of maximum 
surveillance with the development of smaller and smaller sensor devices leading 
to the possibility of ‘smart dust’ (sensor-active nanoparticles) covering the built 
and natural environment (Heller and Peterson, 2009). Computer chips will have 
exponentially greater power in smaller spaces beyond lithographic techniques, 
which many hardware companies are already attempting to do. Heller and 
Peterson (ibid.) report that researchers at Hiroshima University and Nippon Hoso 
Kyokai have developed a photoconductive silicon nanocrystal film with potential 
for use in miniature cameras. A more subtle but nonetheless effective technique of 
surveillance may be biomedical nano-sensors. A growing area of healthcare and 
bioethics now concerns itself with the implications of self-diagnostic devices such 
as the cardiovascular-disease-risk biochip or toxin sensors.  
 
Such ubiquitous monitoring devices bring into question how micro-surveillance 
can track consumption and behavioral patterns. Many civil liberties groups have 
expressed concern about such invasions into privacy as well as the ethics of self-
control versus external-agency control. The agencies external to one’s own 
personal health management include a local doctor’s surgery, insurance firms, or 
even local government.  How far can current global security concerns go in order 
to ‘keep us safe’? Some STS  scholars do not focus on the ethics of a society 
where publics are tied in to surveillance systems —rather it is seen as an 
inevitable ‘actor network’ where institutions,  humans  and non-human concepts 
and devices are intertwined and inseparable in a mesh of social actions (Latour, 
2005).  However, CSOs representing human interests are not convinced that this 
network of information and objects is always beneficial. The norms of privacy are 
beginning to change, with citizens accustomed to increased surveillance using 
more sophisticated and integrated ways, such as smart cameras, GPS and 
radiofrequency identification (RFID). Many scenarios are presented when publics 
are offered glimpses of the future, for instance integration of chips, smart 
materials, and the so-called ‘Internet of Things’ where physical objects and 
cyberspace are more tightly enmeshed. As  computing power increases— again 
through nanotechnology— larger and larger databases are used for the storing, 
management and retrieval of  information from assemblages of people and objects 
in ever-sprouting rhizomes within these networks, all at less and less cost, or so 
the narrative goes.  
 
 
6.145.7 Governance 
 
Section 6.145.6 introduced the inequities of power politically that leads to social 
concerns about how nanotechnology might be used for (or against) society and the 
environment . However, there is much also to be said about the control of science 
and technology itself: science politics more than public politics. 
 
For nanotechnology, much has been made of the problems regarding legislation 
and insurance for platform technologies which have no direct applications yet and 
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whose impact on environment and health even at their foundational stages is still 
unclear. As a result, there are global structures of oversight—although to what 
ends and for whose main benefit may still be debated. Investments are made to 
the NNI in the US by many agencies including the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) to look at the responsible use of nanotechnology (described in Section 
6.145.7.1). Agencies such as National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) in USA, the US Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) and the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) are looking at the safety of 
nanotechnology. The International Risk Governance Council (2007) and the 
Responsible NanoCode (2008) are looking for broader strategies, concentrating 
on food and cosmetics in the former. Although regulation is difficult, there are 
early attempts: nanoscale substances come under the EPA Toxic Substance 
Control Act; there is the EC Code of Conduct; and NIOSH currently disseminates 
alerts on occupational risk. Although these are attempts at regulation and 
governance under existing structures in most cases, there is as yet no direct 
environmental legislation. Despite the transformative talk of nanotechnology 
discourses, regulatory and legislative agencies are still looking at this technology 
through old lenses. 
 
According to Munshi  et al (2007), serious attention to governance matters had 
been slow to appear in any of the major nanotechnology discourse nodes, with the 
most significant literatures developing first in law, scientometrics, and humanistic 
analysis of ideology.  By 2009, however, a small amount of literature has emerged 
on nanotechnology governance, although much of it is a rather superficial 
acknowledgment of the potential political implications of nanotechnology and the 
occasional applications of well-established political theories, concepts, and 
methods to nanotechnology policies and expected consequences.  Most 
governance research falls into three categories:  (i) analysis of government 
promotion of nanotechnology development from the mid 1990s through the 
present by way of massive public funding of research initiatives; (ii) analysis of 
governmental capacities for regulating nanotechnology in the present and in the 
more predictable future of the next decade or so; and (iii) ‘public engagement’ 
with, and democratic control of, nanotechnology issues and policies. 
 
 
6.145.7.1 Science and Technology Policy:  Funding Nanotechnology R&D 
 
In the 21st century, governments have become sponsors and promoters of 
nanotechnology research, development, and deployment.  In the United States, for 
example, something close to consensus among science policy elites under the 
Clinton Administration in the 1990s produced the NNI, an interagency program 
for establishing a major R&D program for realizing the full potential of 
nanotechnology, facilitating technology transfer to fuel the national economy, and 
educating the public to produce a nanotechnology skilled workforce.  The 
initiative eventually led to passage, under the Bush Administration, of the 
Twenty-First Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act of 2003, 
which authorized expenditure of almost level amounts of approximately one 
billion dollars per year for several years.  The NNI is a comprehensive program 
involving twenty-three government agencies, eleven of which receive R&D 
funding.  Other wealthy countries, such as Japan and the United Kingdom, also 
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have identified nanotechnology as an emerging technology to be subsidized and 
have established programs to promote and develop it.   
 
This kind of governmental embrace of nanotechnology, backed by allocation of 
substantial resources, creates winners and losers in political processes that can 
readily be analyzed by traditional social science theories and methodologies. This 
follows the  politics, as famously defined by Harold Lasswell in the 1930s, of 
‘who gets what, when, how’.  Bosso and Rodrigues, for example, analyze how 
nanotechnology fits the pattern of a new policy that creates ‘new stakeholders 
who then organize themselves . . . to maintain and even extend that policy’ (Bosso 
and Rodrigues 2007, p369).  And so now we have the NNI and EU Action Plan. 
Nanotechnology has been described as a driver for economic recovery and 
sustainability, by the so-called ‘green growth’ movement. What has emerged from 
a decade of virtually unconstrained political enthusiasm for nanotechnology 
globally is a new, politically potent, policy advocacy community. Stronger public-
oriented policy measures are required; recently, the OECD Working Party on 
Public Engagement developed ‘points for consideration’ for a nano public-
engagement policy. 
 
 
6.145.7.2 Nanotechnology Regulatory Capacity 
 
 
In the early days of nanoscale research,  there was a near-consensus among all of 
the nanotechnology discourses on the eventual need for some kind of regulatory 
oversight of nanotechnology applications if not of research and development. 
Where there was fundamental disagreement, it was on whether such regulation 
would likely need to be draconian or needed any time soon.    
 
But it appears to be difficult to have a single regulatory framework suitable for the 
range of applications on which nanotechnology will have an impact (International 
Risk Governance Council, 2007). A 2008 conference held in Rovigo, Italy, 
Managing the Uncertainty of Nanotechnologies: Challenges to Law, Ethics and 
Policy Making, highlighted the legislative and regulatory difficulties associated 
with nanotechnology. It is a fraught and uncertain area, as described by the 
conference announcement, when it referred to ‘the heuristic effort’ required to 
deal with regulating and attempting to guide the transformative and uncertain 
nature of nanotechnology (CIGA, 2008). Several international reports have either 
called for, or attempted to, sketch out a regulatory framework including the EU 
Action Plan, the White Paper on Nanotechnology Risk Governance (International 
Risk Governance Council Working Group on Nanotechnology, 2006), reports 
from the ESSA and the FDA,  the EPA (2007)  White Paper on nanotechnology, 
an OECD Working Party (OECD Environment Directorate, 2006), several US 
reports from the Woodrow Wilson Foundation on risk concepts and oversight (see 
especially Macoubrie (2005) and Greenwood (2007), EU opinion reports on 
ethical and social issues (European Commission, 2000, 2003, 2004a; European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission, 
2007) and a Code of Conduct (European Commission, 2007). The precautionary 
principle has been adopted by the EC as a possible regulatory way forward––that 
is, protection of human, environmental, animal and plant health where only 
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preliminary scientific evidence of risk exists (European Commission, 2000). 
However there is opposition to this idea also, as voiced at the Rovigo conference, 
on the grounds that legally the principle is vague. In practical terms, it is 
impossible to predict the outcome of many proposed platform nanotechnologies 
and, therefore, detailed information would be unavailable for the courts in the 
event of legal challenges.  
 
Nanotechnology enthusiasts continue to be concerned that regulatory processes 
and frameworks will impede innovation and commercialization (Kurzweil 2005), 
while concerned writers and political activists issue warning tales and call for 
caution and moratoriums.  With regard to governmental capacity to regulate 
effectively,  
 
relatively little attention has been paid to understanding the 
current capacity and expected needs of the agencies and 
officials that researches, firms, investors, and citizens 
expect to make critical decisions on a wide range of 
emerging nanotechnology applications (Bosso  et al. 2006, 
378).  
 
Most recently, some attention has come from regulatory analysts and technology 
policy scholars on the question of how existing systems of regulation ought to be 
modified to address that have already arisen or seem likely to arise soon (Davies 
2005; Wardak and Regeski 2003; Wardak and Gorman 2006; Marchant and 
Sylvester 2006). Nearly all such analyses assume that all that is needed for 
nanotechnology will be incremental modifications to existing regulatory systems, 
including possibly even some modifications to deregulate commercialization.  In 
part because the likely EHS effects of nanotechnology are still poorly understood, 
and in part because of an unwillingness to confront politically a general (and 
mistaken) belief that technological progress means social good (Sandler and Kay, 
2006), only minor, incremental adaptations are expected to be required, in this 
view.  
 
These biases notwithstanding, little systematic, proactive thinking has been done 
about the regulatory challenges for policy design likely to be posed by nanoscale 
innovations, whether in terms of policy scale, institutions, or tools.  For example, 
most of those who write on the subject assume that the most appropriate locus for 
nanotechnology regulation and governance is, and will continue to be, at the 
national level, yet a strong case can be made that for a technology with such 
transboundary risks and benefits, much of its regulation must inevitably have a 
transnational component, or even be predominantly transnational (Marchant and 
Sylvester, 2006)  It is not clear that current national regulatory systems can ever 
be adapted adequately to address the most important of the environmental and 
social issues likely to posed by a set of technologies with such potentially 
revolutionary characteristics.  Even if current policy systems can be sufficiently 
adapted, nanotechnology, like other emergent technologies such as genetic 
engineering, raises troubling questions about what might constitute appropriate 
democratic ‘engagement’ and control—questions that are even more troubling 
when considered in a transnational context (Baber and Bartlett 2009). 
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In 2001, the case of Kyllo versus United States (Cornell University Law School, 
2009) might at least provide a precedent for protecting privacy and civil liberties. 
This case found police guilty of using intrusive devices on a woman suspected of 
growing large quantities of marijuana.  Heat-seeking technology was used to spot 
lamps used to promote photosynthesis in the plants, and such devices were  
deemed  to be ‘not in general public use…[but used]  to explore details of a 
private home that would previously have been unknowable without physical 
intrusion’ (Heller and Peterson, 2009). The Court decided that the Fourth 
Amendment––protection against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’–– could be 
invoked in such a case. 
 
 
 
6.145.7.3 Public Attitudes and Media Coverage 
 
 
Coverage by the mass media has been used as a key barometer for ideas, opinions 
and ideological biases towards the concept of nanotechnology (Anderson  et al 
2005; Cobb, 2005; Cobb and Macoubrie, 2004; Hornig Priest, 2006; Stephens, 
2005; Scheufele and Lewenstein, 2005; Schütz and Wiedemann, 2008). While 
news media will cover nanoparticle risks from time-to-time, coverage is scant 
across the world and, not surprisingly, awareness is limited (Anderson  et al, 
2005). This is confirmed by surveys of individuals. Cobb and Macoubrie (2004) 
have also found, using what they claim is the first national telephone survey on 
the issue, that initial US reaction to nanotechnology is quite positive, with 
respondents referring to treatment of disease as the best possible outcome and the 
most potential risk associated with surveillance devices and privacy issues, as 
discussed in Section 6.145.6.5.  The issue of trust arose quite prominently in this 
survey, particularly in matters of healthcare where business leaders are involved. 
Often, recognized figures enter debates to play with the public notion of trust. 
Anderson  et al (2005) show how a celebrity can be a catalyst for increased media 
comment, as when the UK media covered Prince Charles’ objection to the use of 
nanotechnology.  
 
Anderson  et al (2005), Cobb and Macoubrie (2004), Cobb (2005), and Scheufele 
and Lewenstein (2005) are well-cited studies of framing of nanotechnology in the 
media.  Cobb (ibid.), in particular, highlights the effects this may have on public 
opinion. For the discourse analyst, frames are a means of organizing discourse 
that, according to Fisher (1997), create ‘common sense’ patterns of images or 
concepts. They emphasize and omit information and, within the framing theories 
of Gamson (1992) and Benford and Snow (2000), there are conscious or 
unconscious attempts by actors to add credence to these patterns by drawing on 
what others may believe, thereby constructing a collective identity for or against a 
concept. There are perhaps some common observations that can be made about 
nanotechnology in the media and of audience/reader responses: first, there is little 
public knowledge of the subject; second, economic and global issue frames are 
prominent (see also Hornig Priest (2006), Stephens (2005) and Anderson  et al 
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(2005) for the identification of these types of frames5); and third, nanotechnology 
peaked in coverage between 2003 and 2005. Many of these studies examine 
audience perceptions from pre-selected newspaper frames (Cobb, 2005; Schütz 
and Wiedemann, 2008). Cobb uses what he calls a ‘thoughtful receiver’ 
hypothesis, which places the citizen into an active agency, yet the model of 
communication still suggests a linear mechanism. However, the constructivist 
paradigm in media studies has changed this linear view of media effects, 
considering instead how other modes of thinking and salient imagery are caught 
up with the effects of media on readers (Scheufele, 1999), and more appropriately 
21st century media effects on the active audience. Scheufele and Lewenstein 
(2005) argue to move beyond framing effects, to look for elements from social 
theory studies of ideologies (a closely related concept).6 While Hackett (1984) 
encourages media analysts to look for ideology rather than the older tradition of 
the ‘objectivity and bias paradigm’ (ibid., p96), there is a strong argument from 
current ‘culturalist’ audience research to consider both audience and producer 
framing in terms of a dialectic process of common understanding. This is 
especially true for complex ideas in socioscientific issues such as biotechnology 
and nanotechnology, where there are complex interactions between concepts of 
science, nature, technology and society. 
 
While there are still many high-profile projects in the social sciences focused on 
‘opinions’ about nanotechnology, more recent methods are sophisticated and 
combine efforts to find out about ‘knowledge’ and ‘attitudes’ with immanent and 
contextual types of public engagement activities. .In fact, within  science 
communication and STS fields in general, there has been a noteworthy 
convergence of  what would have traditionally have been seen as ‘public 
understanding of science’ methods and  more sociologically-inclined work on 
public, civic and community engagement. 
 
 
6.145.7.4 Nanotechnology Public Engagement and Democracy 
 
 
The first House of Lords report on science and society, in 2000, marked a 
significant change of language towards dialogue and public involvement in 
science at policy level in the UK. Social and ethical perspectives on science by 
academics was one thing—public perspectives on the enterprise of science was 
quite another. The fifth report of the House of Lords has strong references to 
nanotechnology (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 
2004). Rob Doubleday (2007) has noted three historical phases of public 
engagement with nanotechnology by the House of Lords, at least as far as public 
debate is concerned. In the first phase, nanotechnology appears on the policy 
stage. In the second phase, more public voices emerge with diverse views on, and 
even opposition to, nanotechnology. Doubleday notes an institutionalization of 
                                                 
5
 Anderson  et al (2005) use the concept of frame relatively loosely in the coding process eg the 
‘science fiction and popular culture’ frame, the ‘business story’ frame. We advocate a refined and 
defined boundary for frames, following Gamson (1992) and Gamson and Modigliani (1989). 
6
 As has been mentioned in Section 6.145.5, in defining the ‘four generations’ of nanostructures, 
the International Risk Governance Council Report (2007) even suggests two ‘frames’ of reference 
around which technological discourses coalesce, the ‘passive’ frame  and the ‘active’ frame. 
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public engagement by the third stage, which , we would argue, sets strategic 
agendas for nanotechnology discourse, even from NGOs taking the talk beyond 
legitimized public concerns. The debate in the UK on active national espousal of 
genetically modified foodstuffs can only serve to demonstrate further what 
happens when public consultation remains within its instrumental remit. In a 
recent report of the Woodrow Wilson Center on future oversight, Davis states that 
the ‘technology of public-participation mechanisms lags behind the science-based 
technologies of the 21st century’ (Davis, 2009, p17). 
 
First-generation contributions to technoscientific, business, governmental official, 
and journalistic discourses about nanotechnology  are all permeated with 
analogies to the controversies of the 1980s and 1990s on genetically modified 
organisms; in the UK, there is an equally popular analogy to the bovine-
spongiform-encephalitis or ‘mad cow’ crisis of the 1990s.  As already stated, 
consensus exists that something went wrong with the way genetically modified 
organisms were introduced and explained to the public that led to widespread 
public resistance.  Nanotechnology is assumed to have the same potential; 
consequently, from early on promoters of nanotechnology have advocated 
learning from this experience and paying greater attention to the possible social 
and ethical implications of nanotechnology and the need for better communication 
with the public (Sandler and Kay, 2006).  In part because of substantial funding 
from the National Science Foundation in the USA and attention focused in the 
UK by an inquiry of Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering (2004), 
there has been a considerable amount of research about public attitudes and 
knowledge, risk communication, and dialogue involving nanotechnology. 
 
One of the first and easiest research tools in technology assessment exercises and 
consultations to look at the social dimensions of nanotechnology is opinion 
surveys.  Such surveys consistently show that the public is generally not aware of 
nanotechnology, with less than a third aware of the term and an even smaller 
fraction able to demonstrate minimal understanding (Royal Society and the Royal 
Academy of Engineering. 2004; Gaskell  et al. 2005; Cobb and Macoubrie, 2004).  
These and other similar findings underpin the standard ‘understanding deficit 
model,’ which postulates that publics distrust new technologies because it is 
ignorant of them; the failures of the publics to accept and adapt to the introduction 
of new technologies stems primarily from lack of knowledge.  The appropriate 
response in this view, and certainly what has been the main response to date, is 
education and exploratory reassurance, or investment in public outreach while 
simultaneously funding assessment of social and ethical implications of the new 
technology.  The NNI in the US, for example, provides substantial funding for 
this kind of one-way risk research and communication, which has been criticized 
because it ‘is focused on education and acceptance, not productive discourse’ 
(Sandler and Kay 2006b, p676).   
 
Some sociological and political questions are raised about nanotechnology that go 
to the very heart of the notion of democracy; for instance, would deliberative 
approaches offer more to public response to controversial technologies than 
representative or aggregate models? However, the loudest debate over public 
engagement seems not to be over any kind of public or democratic control over 
research or technology, but rather the most appropriate timing of public 
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engagement processes.  Rather than ‘downstream’ retrospective engagement, 
when the technology has been launched or even after opinions are already formed, 
some call for ‘upstream’ engagement, or involving citizens prospectively, early in 
R&D phases before major controversies have emerged and opinions have 
polarized (Macnaghten  et al, 2005a, 2005b; Rogers-Hayden et al 2007; Rogers-
Hayden and Pidgeon 2007; Wilsdon and Willis, 2005).  Although the term 
‘upstream’ may over-simplify how innovations occur in science and technology, 
this level of engagement is expected to have several benefits, including making 
possible technological decisions that ‘are sensitive to the ethical and value 
concerns of directly affected groups or populations’ (Rogers-Hayden and Pidgeon 
2007, p192), thereby increasing trust in decision processes and producing more 
widely accepted outcomes.  Some advocates of upstream engagement emphasize 
that the point of engagement or dialogue is more than education about and 
acceptance of nanotechnology, or the promotion of it as a public good.  Rather, it 
is to give non-experts ‘an active and constructive voice when they participate in 
nanotechnology policy’ (Sandler and Kay 2006).  This would include addressing 
‘the power relations a technology embodies’ and ‘the balance between corporate 
and civil society interests and control, and challenging the agendas and practices 
of technoscience R&D’ (Rogers-Hayden, Mohr, and Pidgeon 2007, p127). For 
other advocates of upstream engagement, old democratic ideals are not enough—
new processes of science governance have emerged which demand fresh 
epistemologies of public science with local /global complexities (Irwin, 2006). 
 
Actual democratic governance of nanotechnology is rarely broached, and when it 
is, the arguments rarely draw on either a rich development of democratic theory 
(Baber and Bartlett, 2005) or the equally rich accumulated experience of 
democratic experimentalism of recent decades (Gastil and Levine, 2005).  This is 
true of both the politically active naysayers (McKibben, 2003) and the nano-
enthusiasts.  There is some acknowledgment that public engagement can serve to 
improve the legitimacy of nanotechnology decisions, thus enhancing public 
confidence and trust to the extent of perhaps avoiding the negative outcomes that 
characterized the debate on genetically modified organisms and, in Britain, the 
bovine-spongiform-encephalitis disaster (Rogers-Hayden, Mohr, and Pidgeon 
2007; Sandler and Kay 2006).   But there is little appreciation that modern crises 
of legitimacy can only be addressed by public participation in actual decisions 
about the allocation and amelioration of risk, as has been argued by critical 
theorists such as Beck (1992) and science studies scholars.  The default public 
envisioned for nanotechnology is the ‘global public’, yet the environment for 
nanotechnology is an infinite number of complex and heterogeneous local 
conditions, with policy made by irreducibly heterogeneous human communities 
based on contextually grounded systems of tacit knowledge and mainly place-
based sciences (Baber and Bartlett, 2009).  Small wonder, then, that the 
proponents of nanotechnology prefer not to think beyond minimally democratic 
policy systems that are based on interest aggregation and representation voting 
only but leave real power over the development and deployment of 
nanotechnology in the hands of market forces and those with direct vested 
interests.   
 
Social action from CSOs, combined with the sociological approaches of STS and 
its ilk described previously, have arguably changed the landscape for strategic 
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public engagement of nanotechnology. Suddenly a more ground-up approach has 
evolved and involved more depth of engagement. Types of activities used include 
(i) the constitution of citizen juries, whereby controversial public issues are 
discussed among a ‘jury’ of 12-20 people,  who listen to experts or ‘witnesses,’ 
and make recommendations based on what they have heard; (ii) consensus 
conferences, also containing a small sample of non-experts who have greater 
access to expert processes, held over 2-3 days; and  (iii) deliberative polling or 
mapping where a larger sample, democratically representative and multi-panels of 
stakeholders, exchange commonalities and variances 
 
Other  initiatives at the upstream level have included (i) ‘NanoDialogues’, a UK 
process framed around risk and organised by ScienceWise (2008); (ii) Small Talk 
(2008), organised by a UK government public understanding of science group; 
and  (iii) Nanologue (2009), a Germany-UK-Switzerland joint project holding 
workshops on future scenarios. Upstream models that have gained popularity for 
nanotechnology are consensus conferences, deliberative polling and convergence 
seminars, such as the NanoBio-RAISE event in the Netherlands in 2007 where 
non-experts and experts made recommendations. Recently, the OECD Working 
Party on Public Engagement developed ‘points for consideration’ for nano public 
engagement policy.  
 
Increasing developments on the internet such as Web 2.0 forums and scientists’ 
blogs have opened up new public spaces for science communication (see . It was 
recently claimed that the internet has now overtaken television as a main source 
of science news for publics (Editorial, Nature 2008). This evidence supports 
media anthropological work such as that of Couldry (2003), who studies how 
embedded all types of media have now become in crucial day-to-day practices. 
 
There is also much more to be learnt about the nature of public engagement in 
science and technology issues generally, in this ‘new politics’/active citizenship 
sense, when we refer to the public sphere.  We have snapshots of public opinion 
globally, but a fuller picture is beginning to emerge of a world where there are 
wildly varying levels of engagement from country to country on socioscientific 
issues. Why have so few people heard of nanotechnology? Why is the majority of 
the population in many countries not engaged by the idea of a future 
transformative technology? In the next section, a different perspective of 
understanding and engaging with nanotechnology is presented, one that is 
recognizable for all discourses – the representations that seem to owe more to 
science fiction than popular perceptions of lab science. 
 
 
6.145.8 Imagined Futures  
 
 
6.145.8.1 ‘Fact’ and ‘Fiction’: Social and Cultural Influences  
 
 
As has already been mentioned in Section 6.145.3.4 when discussing military 
applications of nanotechnology, science and science fiction have a symbiotic 
relationship. The creative possibilities of science have not only inspired science 
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fiction writers to imagine the future in utopian terms but have also provoked them 
to manage risk by projecting dystopian scenarios. Concurrently, scientists have 
followed the imagination of science fiction to relentlessly pursue the dreams of 
‘advances’ that promise to improve the world and at the same time work on 
preventing possible catastrophes. It is hardly surprising therefore that some of the 
words now commonly used in scientific discourse were used by science fiction 
writers decades ago: words such as ‘robotics’ in Isaac Asimov’s Liar or ‘genetic 
engineering’ in Jack Williamson’s Dragon Island (Prucher, 2007). 
 
Yet never before has the discourse of science and technology been so lured by the 
seductive power of science fiction as has the discourse of nanotechnology. The 
narrative of this emerging field about which even scientists do not know enough 
about is strikingly similar to that of science fiction. It is about being a ‘portal 
opening on a new world’ (Rita Colwell, cited in Ratner and Ratner, 2003, p1) 
where ‘our ability to work at the ‘molecular level, atom by atom, to create 
something new, something we can manufacture from the ‘bottom up’ opens huge 
vistas’ (David Swain, cited in Ratner and Ratner, 2003, cover). 
 
That the car in the new incarnation of the popular television series Knight Rider 
can not only converse intelligently with humans but also take strategic decisions 
about changing color and size to adapt to rapidly changing situations is hardly 
unusual for a science fiction drama. What is significant, however, is that the 
makers of this television series advertise the fact that the car’s fantastic abilities 
are achieved with the help of nanotechnology. The articulation of this ‘fact’ 
attempts to put nanotechnology on par with science fiction itself. In explaining 
How the New Knight Rider Car Works, Fuller (2009) points out that all the car’s 
extraordinary abilities are actually captured for the digital screen by ‘using 
computer-generated imagery (CGI)’. But the key point is that although ‘the 
filmmakers haven’t released many specifics’ about the three modes within which 
the car works, ‘we can assume the body of the car will change shape with the help 
of nanoscopic machines called assemblers’ (Fuller, 2009). 
 
This is where the blurring of the boundaries between science and science fiction is 
most noticeable. What is described in science fiction is no longer projected to be a 
fantasy. On the contrary, the discourse of nanotechnology appears to thrive on 
pushing the narrative of this emergent technoscience as one that is already in the 
realm of the fantastic. By doing so, it is accelerating the pace of an imagined 
future that is no longer a cyborg future of humans and non-humans in shared co-
existence but a posthuman future where there is no tangible difference between 
perceptions of what is human and what is non-human.  
 
The dissolution of boundaries between fact and fiction has characterized the 
construction of the dominant narrative of nanotechnology (Gimzewski & Vesna, 
2003).  Unlike many other domains of science and technology, the discourse of 
nanotechnology is soaked in claims about its limitless ability to design, engineer, 
and, more importantly, manipulate matter as we know it to turn fiction into 
reality:  
 
Can you imagine making yourself invisible like Harry Potter, 
or a Klingon battleship? Or riding into space on an elevator? 
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Nanotechnology may bring these and many other extraordinary 
ideas out of the story book, off the movie screen, and into 
reality – one day (Challener, 2008). 
 
Such claims, which clearly set the sky as the limit for nanotechnology, run 
parallel to science fiction depictions of the emerging field as is evident in Neal 
Stephenson’s much publicized novel Diamond Age in which nanotechnology-
driven ‘matter compilers’ work like magic wands that can create just about any 
object that can ever be imagined. As Munshi  et al (2007) have pointed out,  
 
the imagined futures of nanotechnology conjured up by 
nanoscientists, which attract billions of dollars for R & 
D from government and industry, are in fact, 
coterminous with science fiction, embodying 
Baudrillard’s notion of ‘hyperreality’ (p. 441).  
 
The French philosopher, Jean Baudrillard (2002) conceptualizes hyperreality to be 
a state where the real world and the fictional world collapse into one another. In 
one of his seminal works Simulacra and Simulations, Baudrillard described the 
Disneyland of Los Angeles as a space that captures hyperreality: ‘The Disneyland 
imaginary is neither true or false: it is a deterrence machine set up in order to 
rejuvenate in reverse the fiction of the real’ (p. 166).  
 
The ‘fiction of the real’ is a key aspect of the discourses around nanotechnology. 
As some commentators have pointed out, many technoscientists promoting the 
cause of nanotechnology actually draw on the narrative techniques of science 
fiction. For example, Lopez (2004) argues that ‘the central metaphor in 
[nanoscience and technology] discourse – nanotechnoscientists as master builders 
– provides a semantic link to SF [science fiction] narrative elements’. This central 
metaphor that portrays ‘nanostructures as the building blocks of matter and the 
nanotechnoscientist as the master builder’ attempts to convey the ‘radical 
transformative powers that [nanoscience and technology] not only denotes but 
also connotes’ (Lopez, 2004). 
 
The fiction of the real can be, of course, both utopian and dystopian. The 
proclaimed limitless capacities of nanotechnology to manipulate matter as we 
know it has also opened up fears about the destructive potential of a technology 
without harness. It is a ‘technology that is hard to control’ and ‘like a virus, a 
nanomachine can develop its own agenda that is part of, or becomes part of, its 
program’ (Melzer, 2006, p195). This aspect of the emerging field has been 
captured by Michael Crichton’s (2002) bestselling novel Prey in which self-
replicating micro-robots create a world of grey and grim chaos. This novel 
illustrates ‘the devastating consequences that result when cutting-edge 
technoscience joins hands with corporate greed and human fallibility’ (Munshi  et 
al. 2007, p441).  
 
Human fallibility is indeed the most vulnerable spot in the discourses around 
nanotechnology for this is a field which is driving the world into what writer such 
as Hayles, Milburn and Fukuyama call a ‘posthuman future’. Fukuyama’s (2002) 
scenario of a posthuman future is constructed on the basis of biotechnology’s 
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potential to alter human nature and yet it is clear that nanotechnology has far 
greater potential to remove the concept of human in a futuristic world than 
biotechnology. As Patricia Melzer (2006) states 
 
nanotechnology comes straight from the labs of 
bioengineers and holds the promising/threatening 
potential for exploding existing paradigms, not only 
within the sciences, but also in our understanding of 
social orders (pp. 179-180).  
 
Richard Calder’s novel Dead Girls brings out the stark face of a posthuman 
future. As Melzer (2006) describes: 
 
Dead Girls is about dolls. Life-size, animated dolls – some fully artificial, 
others half human; some with no consciousness, others with a machine 
consciousness. All of them female, all sexualized. It is in the figures of the 
dolls that the underlying theme of Dead Girls manifests itself, the 
obsession with imitations of the ‘real’: counterfeit versus original, 
mechanical versus human, machine consciousness versus human 
consciousness, and the resulting dissolution of the category ‘real’ in the 
wake of a terrifying, quantum-based nanotechnology. (Melzer, 2006, 
p191) 
 
If indeed nanotechnology will drive the world towards a posthuman future—or if 
our world is already posthuman—what then will be the status of human rights or 
indeed of human notions of privacy and control over mind and body? The 2004 
version of the movie Manchurian Candidate does bring such issues to the 
forefront as it demonstrates how ‘nanotechnology is used to re-jig the central 
nervous system of a key player in a political tussle’ (Munshi  et al, 2007, p. 442).  
As McKie (2003) writes 
 
If the optimistic grand narrative of Western progress is 
underwritten by Science, then science fiction 
consistently reworks that utopic tall tale with 
pessimistic and/or catastrophic outcomes (p131). 
 
In many ways, therefore, it is science fiction that is leading the movement to 
regulate nanotechnology and creating the space to explore the ethical dimensions 
of a technology that claims to radically alter the world.  
 
 
6.145.8.2 The Construction of Utopias and Dystopias 
 
The dichotomized idea that a transformative technology could lead only to a 
utopia or dystopia is inspired and constructed by science fiction. It feeds into 
people’s expectations. Several scenario methodologies have been utilized to 
capture culture and expectations in this way (see, for example, the constructivist 
technology assessment of Arie Rip (Schot and Rip, 1997) or Dave Guston and 
Dan Sarewitz's real-time technology assessment (Guston and Sarewitz, 2002). 
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Perhaps the most (in)famous risk-related written pieces were Bill Joy’s (2000) 
references to ‘grey goo’ scenarios and out-of-control nanobots, which along with 
the ETC Group (2003) may have contributed to Prince Charles’ popularizing the 
ideas through news media opinion pieces (Radford, 2003). But such scenarios are 
not too far removed from futuristic visions set out by Eric Drexler (1986), one of 
the earliest proponents of nanotechnology. These narratives may perhaps be 
within what Erickson (2005) has called the ‘exoteric’ realm. ‘Exoteric and 
‘esoteric’ discourses within science are Erickson’s updating of Ludwig Fleck’s 
thought communities of science.  Esoteric thought communities concern those 
practices of everyday lab science and applied technology while exoteric thought 
communities draw on discourses of science that occur outside these practices. 
 
There is a continuing debate within science communication between those who 
see popularization as a weakened form of scientific dissemination of ‘formal 
science’ (ibid.) and those who see it as part of the process of communication. This 
conflict becomes more acute when fictive-orientated discussions are involved, 
such as dramatization for film or documentary, or indeed discussing technologies 
that are speculative. 
 
Future-oriented narratives are common in media representations of 
nanotechnology, fictional and otherwise (ibid, Erickson 2008). Placing the 
domain of future possibilities and visions into contemporary discourse opens up a 
different type of conversation. Writers such as Hayles (2004) and Milburn (2005) 
refer to the transcendent power of nanotechnology, rather than its more mundane 
practical applications, and these themes are seen in science-fiction blogs, film and 
advertising. However, increasingly, the transcendence of future scenarios are 
brought into formal science or science educational spaces (Brake and Thornton, 
2003; Thurs, 2007). 
 
Speculative narratives and concerns from science fiction, fan fiction and comic-
book popular culture and other forms of cultural imagination are part of what 
might be called the media practices (Couldry, 2004) which engage with 
nanotechnology, using embedded popular cultural understandings of a concept. In 
fact, these fiction-orientated arenas may deal most prominently with some sense 
of risk or concern, such as the ‘grey goo’ scenario.  Rather than considering such 
concerns as outlandish and outside the terms of debate, understanding media 
practices of the ‘cultures of nanotechnology’ might focus away from traditional 
‘risk assessment’ and instrumentalist ideas of public concerns about technology 
and bring public participation closer to the sites of innovation where publics feel 
they have a voice in the eventual policy and regulatory outcome.  
 
While, we may heed the words of Arie Rip and Alfred Nordmann (Nordmann and 
Rip, 2009) in focusing on the inequities and issues associated with practical 
nanotechnology now without getting too drawn into future, unknowable ethics, it 
also useful to note the hyperreality of nanotechnology discourses (esoteric and 
exoteric) are constructed and described as the future here and now, and thus have 
‘clear and present dangers’. 
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6.145.8.3 Scenario Planning 
 
Whereas the construction of scenarios by science fiction writers can seem to be an 
exercise to be indulged in by a few, whose products may have mass readership or 
viewership, planning based on scenarios can be useful for both governments and 
corporations.  
 
Scenario planning has its roots in systems analysis developed by various think 
tanks after the Second World War. Scenario planning is a way to describe the 
current state of an entity and its environs and develop several hypotheses about 
the future of that entity, thereby enabling discussions about how that entity ought 
to evolve. The entity can be a school, a town, a metropolitan area, a province, a 
country, a group of countries, or a corporation, an industry focus group, an 
industrial regulatory agency of a government, or even a national or transnational 
CSO. Scenario planning helps in identifying and learning ‘about the social, 
economic and political factors that engender and influence sociotechnical 
systems, and thus affect[s] the adoption of new technologies and their subsequent 
diffusion’ (Farber and Lakhtakia, 2009, S3). The complexity of the future is 
simplified for analysis, with the understanding that different outcomes are 
possible, all based on some common pre-determined elements as well as on 
elements that differ from scenario to scenario. 
 
Let us examine the power of scenarios. Imagine having to write a poem in iambic 
pentameter on the encounter of a mortal such as Ulysses with an airborne mode of 
transportation. The pre-determined elements are the meter, an ancient Greek hero, 
and a flying object with at least one seat. Whether the flying object is a living 
being or a manufactured object, whether it can seat one or more people, how is it 
powered, how far it can transport, and so on, are elements that will differ from 
poem to poem. Thus, these poems are scenarios which are hypotheses or even 
simulations of the future of transportation.  
 
As Herbert Kahn wrote, 
 
[O]ne must remember that the scenario is not used as a 
predictive device. The analyst is dealing with the unknown 
and to some degree unknowable future. . . . Imagination has 
always been one of the principal means for dealing in various 
ways with the future, and the scenario is simply one of many 
devices useful in stimulating and disciplining the imagination. 
To the extent that particular scenarios may be divorced from 
reality, the proper criticism would seem to be of particular 
scenarios rather than of the method. And of course unrealistic 
scenarios are often useful aids to discussion, if only to point 
out that the particular possibilities are unrealistic (Kahn, 
1990). 
 
Small wonder then that the use of scenario analysis for better understanding of 
the social and ethical implications of nanotechnology is acknowledged in the 
Strategic Plan of the NNI (National Science and Technology Council 2007, p 
31).    
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6.145.9 Conclusion: Nature and Nanotechnology 
 
 
There is optimism in the realization that the ways in which nanotechnology and 
society interact is a growing concern at a strategic level. Large scale academic 
institutions are tasked with this, such as the Center for Nanotechnology and 
Society and the Society for the Study of Nanoscience and Emerging Technologies 
(S-NET). The NNI, under a new Amendments Act passed early during the 
Presidency of Barack Obama in the US, will look closer at the EHS issues 
(Library of Congress, 2009). Framing documents such as the EU Action Plan 
(European Commission, 2005) openly acknowledge that a greater diversity of 
stakeholders are required to govern the many processes of nanotechnology, with 
terms such as ‘expectations’ and ‘concerns’ appearing frequently. Back in 2000, 
the House of Lords began a process of inclusive S&T policy which resulted in 
various British policy documents recommending public consultation and 
involvement.  Green nanotechnology innovation has recently been trumpeted 
(EuroNanoForum, 2009), which paints a more contradictory picture of the 
relationships between sustainability, environmental damage and repair regarding 
nanotechnology. There is a change from the original top-down proclamations 
about nanotechnology. But we must now ensure that regulatory processes are 
adequate and public engagement meaningful.   
 
In this chapter, we have mapped out the complex social domains where 
nanotechnology discourse occurs, centered around health and environment in 
intent, but primarily driven by economics in deed. The scientific understandings 
of the risks to environment and health by nanotechnology have been described, as 
have been their associated social transformative processes, particularly in the 
context of an ecological ‘masterframe’ within society. We have looked at the 
economic promise of nanotechnology, and the areas of economics affected, at 
product development and military applications. We have opened out the 
discussion further to look at the many political dimensions associated with 
nanotechnology governance, and the problems of public engagement. Finally, we 
have considered carefully the increasingly complex relationships between future 
narratives of fiction and comparative narratives of nanotechnology progress. 
 
The central theme of our argument is that it is impossible and indeed unnecessary 
to separate cleanly the technoscientific aspects from the social aspects, 
particularly where public engagement towards a sustainable and responsible 
development of nanotechnology is required. The many nodes and sites of 
discourse we draw on show how many registers can be used when talking about 
nanotechnology. There are also common patterns in the concerns raised about 
nanotechnology’s relationship with nature and the power implications of large 
scale governance of a small scale technology. There needs to be public input to 
strategic development; however the promise of upstream communication has been 
tempered by criticism, some of it coming from within the social action 
communities themselves, particularly of the challenge of meaningfully creating 
the space where upstream input might occur, unprotected by strategic framing of 
activity outputs by their designers and facilitators. The theoretical framework 
drawn on here, from Giddens, Beck and commentators on ecological 
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modernization, would suggest that the new landscapes of science and technology 
very much depend on social networks, reflexivity of strategic framing processes, 
and both shared and conflicting understandings of risk. This is even more so the 
case in the liminal spaces that are created between the many disciplines involved 
in nanotechnology projects. But there can be many shared practices and goals 
between these spaces, for example the urgent need by both NGOs and green 
nanotechnologists to address climate change. However, true sustainability takes 
into account Northworld/Southworld dimensions as well as the publics 
marginalized locally. All communities, whether of knowledge or of habitation, are 
involved in this ‘futurescaping’ or ‘imagineering’, this constructing of multiple 
worlds of possibilities through scenarios; literally, ‘telling stories about the future’ 
(De Geus, 1997, p46). Although innovation is seen by many to be a concept 
detrimental to the process of knowledge construction around nanotechnology, 
caught up as it is with the corporate confines of technoscience, there are 
instruments available to us to at least see through a responsible innovation for 
nanotechnology that is sustainable, in all senses of the word, across networks, 
societies and our future personal lives. 
 
The fields of nanotechnology promise so much that is exciting. If nanotechnology 
delivers on its promise within the social sciences as a space for innovative public 
realization and empowerment, that also applies the lessons learned from emerging 
technology debates of the past, then it truly will be revolutionary.    
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